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The United States electricity sector is engaged in a long-term
experiment regarding the proper role of market competition.
Many states that transitioned to competitive electricity markets in the early 2000s are again reconsidering the relationship between market competition and public policy goals.
Low natural gas prices, falling costs of renewable energy and
energy storage, and improvements in efficiency are causing
early retirements of coal and nuclear power plants and thus
affecting environmental policy goals and economic interests.
States that continue to rely on monopoly utilities for electricity are also reconsidering the role of competition, but from a
different angle. Rather than focusing on mitigating the
downsides of competition, some traditionally regulated states
are creating new opportunities for third parties to compete
with monopoly utilities.
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The implications for electricity sectors in restructured and
traditionally regulated states extend far beyond the particular facilities that stand to gain from new subsidies or the
monopoly utilities subject to new forms of competition. Post
hoc changes to market rules risk wasting resources that will
be necessary to aggressively reduce greenhouse gas emissions, ensure long-term affordability, and mitigate the employment impacts of a transitioning sector.
This Article explores the factors causing policymakers to reconsider the role of competition in the pursuit of energy
goals. It identifies lessons for realizing the benefits of electricity sector competition while managing the downsides that
occur during periods of unanticipated change. In restructured markets, the lessons center on strategies to address job
losses and achieve state environmental goals. In traditionally regulated states, the lessons focus on opportunities to
harness competition to deliver additional societal benefits
without undermining the traditional rate-setting model for
monopoly utilities.
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INTRODUCTION
Are markets or monopolies better suited to deliver affordable, reliable, and clean electric power? A long-term experiment
is underway in the U.S. electricity sector to answer the question.
Historically, states relied on public utilities—vertically integrated monopolies that own electricity generation, transmission, and distribution systems—to provide affordable and reliable electric power. 1 The federal government started creating
opportunities for competition among wholesale electricity generators in the 1970s. Some states took more dramatic steps to
foster electricity-sector competition in the 1990s and early
2000s by transitioning away from vertically integrated utilities.
Policymakers in these states believed competition would deliver lower electricity prices, better environmental outcomes,
and greater opportunities for innovation. 2 Other states continued to rely on traditional electric utilities, trusting the established monopoly model to continue delivering affordable and
reliable electricity. 3
Recent developments are causing policymakers to once
again consider the balance between competitive markets, monopolies, and financial support for certain facilities. Some
1. DAVID P. TUTTLE ET AL., THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE U.S.
ELECTRIC INDUSTRY 2–3 (2016), http://sites.utexas.edu/energyinstitute/files/2016/
09/UTAustin_FCe_History_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8TZ-FZHZ].
2. See, e.g., ELIZABETH B. STEIN & FERIT UCAR, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, DRIVING
ENVIRONMENTAL OUTCOMES THROUGH UTILITY REFORM 6–9 (Jan. 2018), https://
www.edf.org/sites/default/files/documents/driving-environmental-outcomes.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P3AY-BKE9].
3. TUTTLE ET AL., supra note 1, at 3.
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states that embraced competitive markets are now grappling
with whether, and how, to control the downsides of competition. Many nuclear and coal-fired power plants are struggling
to remain profitable in competitive markets, due primarily to
low natural gas prices. 4 Some states have responded with new
programs to compensate nuclear facilities for their role in
providing carbon-free electricity. 5 The Trump administration
has proposed subsidizing economically vulnerable coal and nuclear facilities, justifying the move as necessary to ensure grid
reliability. 6 These strategies differ significantly from one another in both their underlying policy goals and the data supporting them. Without subsidies for nuclear power plants,
states will be unable to meet their respective decarbonization
goals. 7 In contrast, the Trump administration is promoting
subsidies for coal and nuclear facilities despite the lack of evidence that the facilities are necessary for reliability. 8 Although
there are important differences between the state and federal
efforts, they share an important trait: each attempts to insulate certain power plants from competitive pressures.
States with monopoly utilities face a different set of questions. Rather than focusing on mitigating the downsides of
competition, some traditionally regulated states are now exploring mechanisms to realize the benefits of competition while

4. Ari Natter, Coal Plants Keep Shutting Despite Trump’s Order to Rescue
Them, BLOOMBERG (June 18, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2018-06-18/coal-plants-keep-shutting-despite-trump-s-order-to-rescue-them [https://
perma.cc/YFR6-GSC8]; see also Sonal Patel, More Premature Nuclear Unit
Retirements Loom, POWER (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.powermag.com/morepremature-nuclear-unit-retirements-loom/ [https://perma.cc/QJ3S-4CBV].
5. DANIEL SHEA & KRISTY HARTMAN, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
STATE OPTIONS TO KEEP NUCLEAR IN THE ENERGY MIX 21–27 (Jan. 2017),
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/energy/StateOptions_NuclearPower_f02
_WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/5AC4-Z2EQ].
6. Brad Plumer, Trump Orders a Lifeline for Struggling Coal and Nuclear
Plants, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/climate/
trump-coal-nuclear-power.html [https://perma.cc/C3CB-LXXE].
7. Russell Gold, Utility Jobs Lost as New Power Plants Need Fewer Workers,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/utility-jobs-shrink-asnew-power-plants-need-fewer-workers-1516021200 [https://perma.cc/6AWJ-TVXW];
see also Brad Plumer, How Retiring Nuclear Power Plants May Undercut U.S.
Climate Goals, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/017/06/13
/climate/nuclear-power-retirements-us-climate-goals.html [https://perma.cc/XM574UFX].
8. See infra Section III.B.
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also preserving the cost-of-service model. 9 Strategically harnessing competition to enhance utilities’ accountability, responsiveness to consumer demands, and risk management practices
can help protect ratepayers in the face of uncertain futures.
Post hoc changes to rules for electricity-sector competition
not only impact market participants but also risk wasting resources that will be necessary to aggressively reduce greenhouse gas emissions, ensure long-term affordability, and mitigate employment impacts of a transitioning sector. The changing approaches to competition also call into question the
socially beneficial makeup of the electricity sector and the
proper balance between competition and regulation.
Numerous scholars are exploring the important jurisdictional implications of these state and federal market interventions. 10 These inquiries focus on who may—or who should—establish energy policy goals and create the rules necessary to
achieve them. The “who decides” question is a critical element
in the energy policy debate, evidenced by the dramatic shift in
federal policy priorities as the Trump administration seeks to
overturn much of the Obama administration’s environmental
regulations. Resolving jurisdictional arguments, however, would
only address one aspect of the regulatory uncertainty hanging
over electricity-sector stakeholders. Federal and state policymakers may pursue different choices if given broader authority
over the sector, but both are second-guessing the proper role of
competition in achieving energy policy goals. This perspective
is not limited to one political ideology or to one region of the
country, and jurisdictional certainty will not resolve questions
regarding the proper role of market competition.
This Article argues that competition can play an important
role in achieving societal benefits in restructured and traditionally regulated states. 11 Doing so, however, requires proactive
9. See infra Part IV. “Cost of service” refers to compensating electric utilities
for the cost of providing the service plus a rate of return that allows the company
to attract investors and satisfy debt obligations.
10. See infra Part I.
11. Electricity markets take many forms, and it is not the goal of this Article
to explore each. Furthermore, the distinctions between competitive electricity
markets and traditionally regulated electricity markets are not absolute. States
do not rely solely on one model or the other. Bilateral contracts, participation in
wholesale electricity markets, renewable energy mandates, and fixed infrastructure costs are just some examples of the interactions between electricity
markets and public policy across the country. Yet these recent changes signal a
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strategies that address the downsides of competition. Electricity market choices have social costs. These costs are reflected in
electricity rates and the state’s resulting ability to attract and
retain energy-intensive industries. They are also reflected in
the job losses and related public health impacts in communities
dependent on coal-fired generation, as well as the ongoing
health and environmental costs associated with fossil-fuel-fired
generation.
There are models for incorporating these social and environmental goals more directly into electricity governance. For
example, many states that opted into competitive electricity
markets in the early 2000s implemented a “competitive transition charge” to compensate utilities for any sunk costs that
they could not otherwise recover. 12 A similar approach could
fund economic development and job retraining efforts in communities suffering job losses as older power plants retire. The
Federal Power Act and state utility laws are generally broad
enough to allow greater consideration of environmental policy
impacts. In traditionally regulated states, policymakers are already experimenting with new forms of electricity-sector competition and could target these efforts to achieve social policy
goals.
The Article explores evolving approaches to markets and
competition, but it does not take a position on the relative
merits of competitive or traditionally regulated electricity sectors. Both have value, particularly during a period of rapid
technological developments. 13 Some innovations are more
likely to emerge in competitive markets where grid operators
may be agnostic between the choice of purchasing additional
electricity versus using other means to satisfy electricity
demand. 14 Traditionally regulated states may facilitate other
more fundamental rethinking of competition and social policy. The result is a
blending of market-based and cost-of-service approaches as policymakers seek the
proper balance of social policy goals and market reliance.
12. See FRANCISCO FLORES-ESPINIO ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB.,
COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKET REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A
PRIMER 9–10 (Dec. 2016), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy17osti/67106.pdf [https://
perma.cc/F94L-3W88].
13. William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking
and Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810, 835–78 (2016)
(discussing rate-setting innovations in competitive and traditionally regulated
systems).
14. See Michael Wara, Fostering Competition in the 21st Century Electricity
Industry, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. F. 41, 47–48 (2016).
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innovations, such as implementing new approaches to rate
setting and incentivizing investment in next-generation energy
technologies. 15
Part I provides a brief history of electricity-sector competition to provide context for the discussions of restructured and
traditionally regulated electricity sectors that follow. Parts II
and III explore the different relationships to competition in traditionally regulated and restructured markets. 16 Proponents of
restructuring argued that it would increase natural gas generation and remove barriers to energy efficiency and renewable
energy. 17 These rapid changes are leading some restructured
states to implement their own market-correction efforts, such
as “zero emission credits” (ZECs), and leading the Department
of Energy to propose subsidies for coal and nuclear power
plants. 18 Part III contrasts these responses with efforts in
traditionally regulated territories to expand opportunities for
electricity competition: North Carolina’s new competitive procurement process for solar energy, a Nevada law allowing energy users to exit the monopoly’s exclusive service territory,
and a recent Nevada ballot measure calling for the state to restructure its electricity sector.
Part IV identifies four crucial lessons for realizing social
and environmental benefits in both competitive electricity markets and the territories of traditionally regulated monopolies.
First, core societal values continue to drive electricity-sector
policy and will have direct impacts on the evolution of the sector. Second, case-by-case efforts to support specific, existing
15. See, e.g., David A. Repka & Tyson R. Smith, Deep Decarbonization and
Nuclear Energy, 48 ENVTL. L. REP. 10244, 10257 (2018) (discussing the role of cost
recovery in incentivizing new nuclear construction).
16. Restructured states rely on regional transmission organizations (RTOs) to
design and operate wholesale electricity markets to achieve the core energy
values. The market rules benefit some market participants more than others (e.g.,
capacity auctions excluding intermittent resources such as solar energy). Some
restructured states have been generally agnostic regarding electricity generation
options, while others impose additional market-based measures on RTO markets
(e.g., carbon markets, renewable portfolio standards, energy efficiency programs).
This latter category of restructured states treats competition as the means to
achieve numerous societal goals that extend beyond affordability and reliability.
17. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., A Proposal to Deregulate the Market for
Bulk Power, 72 VA. L. REV. 1183 (1986).
18. See Ray Gifford & Matt Larson, The DOE NOPR: An Inevitable Next Step
in Power “Market” Regulation, UTIL. DIVE (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.utility
dive.com/news/the-doe-nopr-an-inevitable-next-step-in-power-market-regulation
/506703/ [https://perma.cc/468U-C4VS]; Plumer, supra note 6.
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facilities are resulting in a post hoc cost-of-service approach
without direct oversight of system needs and rates. Third, ZEC
programs and the Trump administration’s proposed subsidies
are reactions to electricity prices falling below the level necessary to deliver social benefits. Without proactive measures to
help communities weather economic impacts and ensure that
states achieve environmental goals, reactive, case-by-case responses will likely continue. Finally, policymakers in traditionally regulated states may harness market forces to deliver
new benefits to ratepayers without rejecting the monopoly
utility model. 19
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF ELECTRICITY-SECTOR COMPETITION

State oversight of the electricity sector once depended
largely on monopoly utilities to provide affordable, reliable
power. 20 Public utilities accepted the obligation to provide
affordable and reliable electricity at rates determined by state
public utilities commissions (PUCs). In exchange, state law
prohibited other entities from selling electricity to retail customers within the utilities’ respective service territories. 21
PUCs replaced market competition with rates based on the
utility’s costs of providing reliable electricity. 22 This approach,
referred to as cost-of-service rate setting, sought to compensate
utilities for capital investments and ensure the financial viability of the firm, including allowing a reasonable rate of return

19. This creates a new opportunity to realize the early vision of the public
utility as an undertaking to “harness[ ] the power of private enterprise and
direct[ ] it toward public ends.” William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon
Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614, 1619–20 (2014).
20. W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 325–
26 (2d ed. 1995). Allowing electric utilities, water utilities, and telecommunication
companies to operate as monopolies took advantage of economies of scale, scope,
and coordination. STEVE ISSER, ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING IN THE UNITED
STATES: MARKETS AND POLICY FROM THE 1978 ENERGY ACT TO THE PRESENT 12–
13 (2015) (discussing the distinction between the terms deregulation and restructuring in the context of electricity regulation). The adoption of the monopoly structure and state-imposed exclusive service territory was not intended to squash
innovation. Boyd, supra note 19, at 1647 (“The broad concept of public utility
advanced by progressives and legal realists thus embodied a pragmatic approach
to competition and markets in an era of rapid industrial change . . . .”).
21. Joseph P. Tomain, Electricity Restructuring: A Case Study in Government
Regulation, 33 TULSA L.J. 827, 832 (1998).
22. Id.
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on capital investments to attract investors. 23 Rate setting removed financial risk for the electricity provider, allowing utilities to access the capital and equity necessary for expensive infrastructure investments. 24 State law granted public utilities
exclusive service territories—specific geographic areas in which
the respective public utility would be the exclusive provider of
electricity. 25
Providing a rate of return for capital investments naturally
incentivizes the private firm to pursue high-cost infrastructure
projects. 26 PUCs control for this incentive by relying on the
“least cost mandate” approach—with the default assumption
that a prudent investment by a regulated monopoly is the
lowest-cost option that meets demand, complies with applicable
laws, and satisfies other relevant criteria. 27
The cost-of-service rate-setting model has been the subject
of multiple criticisms over the years, including: regulatory capture; 28 information asymmetries between utilities and utility
commissions resulting in approval of unnecessary, or unnecessarily expensive, capital projects; 29 and inherent incentives for
utilities to maximize capital expenditures in order to increase
shareholder returns. 30 These criticisms were amplified in the
23. Boyd & Carlson, supra note 13, at 827.
24. See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 19, at 1643–44. “The planning, sequencing, and
financing of hundreds of billions of dollars in new investments needed to modernize the electric power grid and build new low carbon generation will require a
level of certainty regarding cost recovery that markets alone will have difficulty
providing.” Id. at 1618.
25. Id. at 1643.
26. Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under
Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1068 (1962).
27. Jonas J. Monast, Maximizing Utility in Electric Utility Regulation, 43
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 135, 146–49 (2015).
28. Boyd, supra note 19, at 1652 (citing George J. Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971)).
29. Paul L. Joskow, Incentive Regulation in Theory and Practice: Electricity
Distribution and Transmission Networks, in ECONOMIC REGULATION AND ITS
REFORM: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 291 (2014), http://www.nber.org/chapters/
c12566.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4NP-EAEC]; Adam R. Fremeth & Guy L.F.
Holburn, Information Asymmetries and Regulatory Decision Costs: An Analysis of
U.S. Electric Utility Rate Changes 1980-2000, 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 127 (2012);
John S. Moot, Economic Theories of Regulation and Electricity Restructuring, 25
ENERGY L.J. 273, 287 (2004) (noting that cost-of-service ratemaking was blamed
for exacerbating nuclear cost overruns because facilities were not cancelled early);
David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 765, 771 (2008).
30. JIM LAZAR & REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT STAFF, ELECTRICITY
REGULATION IN THE US: A GUIDE 86–87 (2d ed. 2016), http://www.raponline.org/
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late 1970s and 1980s as the combination of high inflation, decreased demand for electricity, and the Three Mile Island accident resulted in cancelled nuclear projects. 31
Many of the critics of vertically integrated electric utilities
argued that competitive markets would result in lower prices
and better services, enhance innovation, and better achieve environmental goals. 32 The criticisms were not uniform, however. 33 Over half of the states continued to view the vertically
integrated electric utility as the best option for meeting electricity-sector goals, but a growing chorus of stakeholders and
policymakers viewed competition as necessary to induce cost
discipline on utility executives. 34
The 1978 Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA)
was an initial step toward utilizing competition to transform
the electricity sector in socially beneficial ways. 35 The law required local utilities to purchase power from qualifying faciliwp-content/uploads/2016/07/rap-lazar-electricity-regulation-US-june-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D9SK-RU6Y] (noting that traditional monopoly utility regulation may incentivize higher operating expenses because understaffed PUCs often
approve higher operating expenses that can increase the revenues that utilities
are allowed to earn in future years); Joseph P. Tomain, The Past and Future of
Electricity Regulation, 32 ENVTL. L. 435, 448 (2002).
31. See Pierce, supra note 17, at 1183–86; see also Douglas Martin, 3 Mile
Island: Financial Fallout, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1981, at D1, https://www.ny
times.com/1981/01/13/business/3-mile-island-financial-fallout.html [https://perma.
cc/AU72-BJ85].
32. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 17, at 1192 (“These inefficiencies fall into
seven basic categories: (1) incomplete realization of economies of scale and
coordination; (2) distortion of investment decisions by Averch-Johnson and
negative Averch-Johnson effects; (3) opportunistic behavior by regulators; (4)
intertemporal distortion of rates and investment decisions caused by embedded
cost ratemaking; (5) inefficiencies created by retail rate structures not based on
marginal cost principles; (6) distorted purchase and use incentives created by
wholesale rate structures not based on marginal cost principles; and (7)
distortions created by opportunities to purchase bulk power from loosely regulated
corporate affiliates.”).
33. Douglas Gagax & Kenneth Nowotny, Competition and the Electric Utility
Industry: An Evaluation, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 63, 72–76 (1993) (noting the
continued cost benefits of centralized electricity generation).
34. Spence, supra note 29, at 774–75; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., STATUS OF
STATE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING ACTIVITY AS OF FEBRUARY 2003 (Feb.
2003), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/legislation/california/pdf/restructure.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JL94-TKDW].
35. See Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act, 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012); see
also Chris Warren, Once an Obscure Law, PURPA Now Drives Utility-Scale Solar.
Regulatory Conflict Quickly Followed, GREENTECH MEDIA (Feb. 23, 2017),
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/purpa-is-causing-conflict-in-montana
[https://perma.cc/9CDR-75DZ].
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ties at the utility’s “avoided cost,” thus reducing barriers to
electricity generation from renewable energy and combinedheat-and-power sources. 36 In doing so, PURPA required utilities and PUC commissioners to treat electricity generation and
delivery as separate services with different prices. 37 Together,
these steps “demonstrated the viability of competitive entry
into the capital-intensive power generation business.” 38 Subsequent steps to unbundle transmission and generation services
include FERC Order 888, which requires open access to interstate transmission lines and lays out initial requirements for
independent system operators (ISOs), and FERC Order 2000,
which establishes requirements for regional transmission organizations. 39
Some states opted to move away from cost-of-service
regulation in the 1990s and 2000s following FERC’s efforts to
facilitate market-based competition. 40 These states required
their state-regulated monopoly utilities to divest themselves of
generation and transmission assets. 41 In these states, monopolies still operate electricity grids to deliver power to retail customers (i.e., end users of electricity). 42 Some of these states al36. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a)–(b); Moot, supra note 29, at 274.
37. PURPA, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (Nov. 9, 1978); Spence, supra
note 29, at 772–74.
38. Matthew W. White, Power Struggles: Explaining Deregulatory Reforms in
Electricity Markets, BROOKINGS PAPERS: MICROECONOMICS 201, 207 (1996),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/1996/01/1996_bpeamicro_white.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YWX3-WL6Z].
39. Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. 810
(Jan. 6, 2000); Jim Rossi, The Common Law “Duty to Serve” and Protection of
Consumers in an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 1233, 1280 (1998) (“[T]he most significant event to date in electricity
industry restructuring is a rulemaking FERC adopted in 1996, known as the
electricity mega-Grid Resiliency NOPR or Order No. 888. Order No. 888 is
designed to restructure wholesale markets for electricity, in a manner similar to
FERC’s competitive restructuring of the natural gas industry which FERC
achieved in 1992 by adopting Order No. 636.”).
40. Ari Peskoe, Easing Jurisdictional Tensions by Integrating Public Policy in
Wholesale Electricity Markets, 38 ENERGY L.J. 1, 3–4 (2017); Boyd, supra note 19,
at 1628–29. Numerous states were at various stages of considering restructuring
but put those efforts on hold in the aftermath of the California electricity crisis.
Spence, supra note 29, at 774–75 (“[The] California energy crisis of 2000−2001
cowed some states into halting their restructuring plans, though retail
competition continued in sixteen states and the District of Columbia.”).
41. See Spence, supra note 29, at 784 n.104; ISSER, supra note 20, at 1
(discussing the distinction between the terms deregulation and restructuring in
the context of electricity regulation).
42. Rossi, supra note 39, at 1283.
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low consumers to choose their electricity provider, while others
rely on the operator of local grids to purchase and deliver electricity. 43 PUCs continue to oversee rates charged for the operation of these distribution systems and, in instances where distribution companies are purchasing power on behalf of their
consumers, the prices distribution companies pay for electricity. 44 These restructured states depend on regional transmission organizations (RTOs) or independent system operators
(ISOs) to operate wholesale electricity markets and the transmission systems. 45
The details of restructuring vary by state. When this Article refers to competitive markets, it is primarily referencing experiences in three RTO/ISO markets—PJM, New York ISO
(NYISO), and New England (ISO-NE)—for four reasons. 46 The
first is size. Together, these RTO territories serve a population
of almost one hundred million. 47 The second is FERC jurisdiction, which makes federal oversight of wholesale electricity
markets a key factor. 48 (The Texas electricity system (ERCOT)
presents some of the same issues, but because the system is entirely within the state borders, FERC does not have jurisdiction. 49) The third is the fact that these markets include restructured states. The NYISO is fully restructured, as is ISO-NE,

43. David B. Spence, Coal-Fired Power in a Restructured Electricity Market,
15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 187, 202 (2005).
44. Jonas J. Monast & Sarah K. Adair, Completing the Energy Innovation
Cycle: The View from the Public Utility Commission, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1345,
1378–81 (2014) (discussing Rhode Island PUC oversight of a contract to purchase
electricity from an offshore wind facility).
45. Boyd & Carlson, supra note 13, at 837.
46. Other RTOs, such as the Midcontinent ISO (MISO) and the Southwest
Power Pool (SPP) strike a middle ground, with electricity generators competing in
energy markets but PUCs still providing cost recovery for capital investments and
therefore addressing capacity needs.
47. See PJM, PJM LOAD FORECAST REPORT 9 (2018), https://www.pjm.com//media/library/reports-notices/load-forecast/2018-load-forecast-report.ashx?la=en
[https://perma.cc/8DPF-VFEJ]; Key Grid and Market Stats, ISO-NEW ENGLAND,
https://www.iso-ne.com/about/key-stats/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2018) [https://perma.
cc/PUK5-KU3J]; TARIQ NIAZI, N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, INTRODUCTION TO THE
NYISO & NY’S WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS 5 (May 25, 2016), https://www
.nyserda.ny.gov/-/media/Files/EDPPP/LIFE/Conferences/ [https://perma.cc/WH2EQ73D].
48. See Clinton Vince et al., What Is Happening and Where in the World of
RTOs and ISOs?, 27 ENERGY L.J. 65, 76–80 (2006).
49. David B. Spence, Introduction to ERCOT’s Jurisdictional Status, 3 TEX. J.
OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 1, 1 (2008).
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with the exception of Vermont. 50 PJM is a hybrid market that
includes some restructured states and some that require electric utilities to transfer control of transmission assets to the
RTO and participate in competitive energy markets, but PUCs
continue their historic rate-setting role. 51 The final reason is
that each of these markets include nuclear power plants that
have recently become uneconomic due to low natural gas
prices. 52
RTO market design choices are not agnostic. The manner
in which RTOs price various attributes (e.g., location and ability to dispatch when needed) influences the relative competitiveness among energy resources. 53 Reliability rules dictate
certain investments, and RTOs regularly adjust capacity
auction rules to incentivize a sufficient number of generation
owners to ensure that their facilities will be available to
provide electricity at a future date. 54 Capacity markets, for
example, may reward dispatchable generation options (i.e.,
power plants that can provide electricity when needed, in
contrast to energy resources such as solar and wind), create
barriers to renewable energy investments, and minimize the
role of state energy policies. 55
50. See Vermont Electric Utilities, VT. DEPT. OF PUB. SERV., http://public
service.vermont.gov/electric (last visited Oct. 7, 2018) [https://perma.cc/4R8M24L94]; SUSAN F. TIERNEY, THE NEW YORK INDEPENDENT OPERATING SYSTEM: A
TEN-YEAR REVIEW 2 (2010), https://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedfiles/content/
insights/publishing/tierney_nyiso_10_year_review.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2YKW94JQ].
51. See Erin T. Mansur, Upstream Competition and Vertical Integration in
Electricity Markets, 50 J.L. & ECON. 125, 125–26 (2007).
52. See David Solimeno, Note, Armageddon: The Inevitable Death of Nuclear
Power and Whether New York State Has the Legal Authority to Keep It on Life
Support, 35 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 135, 143–44 (2017).
53. Danny Cullenward & Shelley Welton, The Quiet Undoing: How Regional
Electricity Market Reforms Threaten State Clean Energy Goals, 36 YALE J. ON
REG. (2018–19), http://yalejreg.com/the-quiet-undoing-how-regional-electricitymarket-reforms-threaten-state-clean-energy-goals/ [https://perma.cc/K43R-ELGV]
(criticizing FERC efforts to undermine state renewable energy policies).
54. Capacity markets don’t guarantee that the electricity will be purchased.
Instead, they pay companies for being available if needed. Emily Hammond &
David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV.
141, 153 (2016).
55. Cullenward & Welton, supra note 53; 163 FERC ¶ 61,236 (2018).
“Resource offers (or bids into the market) that are deemed subsidized would be
subject to an expanded Minimum Offer Price Rule (MOPR) with few or no
exceptions, which would bump up these offers to a price deemed competitive.”
Jennifer Chen, Understanding FERC’s Order Rejecting PJM’s Capacity Market
Proposals and the Proposed Replacement Framework, NICHOLAS INST.: DUKE U.
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Other examples of utilizing competition to achieve social
goals abound. Twenty-nine states have implemented renewable
portfolio standards that create mandatory renewable energy
targets, thus guaranteeing market demand for qualifying renewable energy generation. 56 State net metering policies create
market incentives for homeowners and businesses to invest in
rooftop solar generation. 57 Some RTOs and ISOs utilize capacity markets—essentially auctions for the promise that dispatchable electricity generation will be prepared to supply
power at a later date—to address concerns that electricity market prices may not incentivize sufficient construction and maintenance investments necessary to ensure reliability. 58 State
and federal policies utilize market-based environmental policies to create incentives to invest in pollution control technologies and/or lower-emitting resources. 59 RTOs, stakeholders,
and scholars are considering strategies to implement carbon
pricing pursuant to the existing authority in the Federal Power
Act. 60 An emerging focus on transactive energy—a dynamic approach to electricity markets that can accommodate distributed
resources and integrate smart grid technologies—demonstrates
potential changes to platforms facilitating competition. 61

(July 18, 2018), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/articles/understanding-ferc
%E2%80%99s-order-rejecting-pjm%E2%80%99s-capacity-market-proposals-andproposed [https://perma.cc/993Y-49WE]; see also Jennifer Chen, PJM’s New Rules
Skew Against Clean Energy; Silver Lining in a Lower Forecast, NRDC: EXPERT
BLOG (May 24, 2016), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/jennifer-chen/pjms-newrules-skew-against-clean-energy-silver-lining-lower-forecast
[https://perma.cc/
NW86-7BHZ].
56. State Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals, NAT’L CONF. STATE
LEGISLATURES (July 20, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renewableportfolio-standards.aspx [https://perma.cc/5DWG-VDRP].
57. See Julia Pyper, More Than Half of U.S. States Are Studying or Changing
Net Metering Policies, GREENTECH MEDIA (Nov. 13, 2015), https://www.greentech
media.com/articles/read/more-than-half-of-us-states-are-studying-or-changing-netmetering-policies [https://perma.cc/86AV-B72D].
58. Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid,
49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1783, 1824 (2016).
59. Jonas Monast, From Top-Down to Bottom-Up Climate Policy: New
Challenges in Carbon Market Design, 8 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 175,
180, 185 (2017).
60. Peskoe, supra note 40, at 15–16.
61. Transactive Energy: An Overview, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH.
(Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.nist.gov/engineering-laboratory/smart-grid/transactiveenergy-overview [https://perma.cc/KL2L-3HYK]; see also Joel B. Eisen & Felix
Mormann, Free Trade in Electric Power, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 49, 53–54, 57–77
(2018).
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These market interventions are important elements of the
complex policy ecosystem that will influence the future makeup
of the U.S. electricity grid, but a detailed analysis of the respective efforts is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, this
analysis focuses on recent shifts in views of competition that
are seemingly at odds with a state’s chosen approach—competitive markets or monopoly utilities—to identify lessons for the
role of competition in achieving social goals.
II. RETHINKING COMPETITION IN RESTRUCTURED STATES
Competitive electricity markets have been far more disruptive to the power sector than the proponents of restructuring
could have foreseen. 62 Natural gas prices are hovering at historic lows. 63 Electricity-demand growth is generally flat and
may soon decline. 64 Prices for wind and solar energy have fallen significantly and both are playing a growing role in electricity generation. 65 In some states, wind energy is able to com62. See, e.g., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DOE/EIA-0383, ANNUAL ENERGY
OUTLOOK 2006 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2030 (Feb. 2006), https://www.eia.gov/
outlooks/archive/aeo06/electricity.html [https://perma.cc/7FVW-NBU8] (projecting
that “[c]oal-fired and natural-gas-fired plants account for about 50 percent and 40
percent, respectively, of the capacity additions from 2004 to 2030”). As further
evidence of the rapidly changing market dynamics, the 2006 Annual Energy
Outlook states that “[c]oal-fired capacity is generally more economical to operate
than natural-gas-fired capacity, because coal prices are considerably lower than
natural gas prices. As a result, new natural-gas-fired plants are built to ensure
reliability and operate for comparatively few hours when electricity demand is
high.” Id.
63. Future U.S. Electricity Generation Will Depend Largely on Natural Gas
Prices, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/todayin
energy/detail.php?id=34852 [https://perma.cc/5WSX-JX96] [hereinafter Future
U.S. Electricity Generation]. Note, however, that natural gas prices exhibit
seasonal fluctuations, with higher prices in winter months due to increased
demand for heat. Natural Gas Prices Reflect Decreasing Seasonality, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 20, 2013), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=
13871 [https://perma.cc/QQ9B-YBVJ].
64. U.S. Economy and Electricity Demand Growth Are Linked, but Relationship Is Changing, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 22, 2013), https://www.eia
.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=10491 [https://perma.cc/AFN3-PFTD].
65. See Jairo Chung & Jim Hempstead, Utilities Increasingly Adding Low
Cost Wind Power to Rate Base, Leaving Inefficient Coal Plants at Risk, MOODY’S
INV. SERV. (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Utilitiesincreasingly-adding-low-cost-wind-power-to-rate--PR_363547
[https://perma.cc/
SB54-RPR3]; Michael O’Boyle, Wind and Solar Are Our Cheapest Electricity
Generation Sources. Now What Do We Do?, GREENTECH MEDIA (Jan. 26, 2017),
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/wind-and-solar-are-our-cheapestelectricity-generation-sources-now-what-do#gs.KyyugMY [https://perma.cc/T8HW-
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pete on a cost basis with coal. 66 Coal-fired power plants provided approximately half of the nation’s electricity generation
between 1995 and 2005, but that number dropped to 30 percent
by 2015, and additional retirements are expected to continue at
least through the near future. 67 “War on coal” rhetoric that was
common during most of the Obama presidency suggested that
these impacts were due to deliberate policy choices, but it was

MGKK] (explaining that while solar and wind pricing have decreased
dramatically since 2009, certain states have seen more of a decrease than others);
Earl J. Ritchie, The Cost of Wind and Solar Intermittency, FORBES (Jan. 24, 2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/uhenergy/2017/01/24/the-cost-of-wind-and-solarintermittency [https://perma.cc/MF7J-228B].
66. Ritchie, supra note 65.
67. MJ BRADLEY & ASSOC., COAL-FIRED ELECTRICITY GENERATION IN THE
UNITED STATES AND FUTURE OUTLOOK 2 fig.1 (Aug. 28, 2017), http://www.mj
bradley.com/sites/default/files/MJBAcoalretirementissuebrief.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YN8Y-QA55]. Coal-fired power plants
[A]ccounted for 51 percent of total U.S. electricity generation on average
from 1949 through 2005. However, since that time, coal’s share of
generation has declined at a steady clip [ ]. In 2016, U.S. coal plants
accounted for just 30 percent of total generation output, according to
government figures—2016 was a year of record low natural gas prices in
the U.S. contributing to the decline in coal generation. For the first time,
in 2016, natural gas was the leading source of electricity generation (34
percent of total generation), reflecting an on-going trend that is
reshaping the nation’s generation mix.
Id. at 1. Coal retirements between 2010 and 2015 were caused by a combination of
low natural gas prices and the EPA’s 2011 rule limiting mercury emissions. Coal
Made Up More Than 80% of Retired Electricity Generating Capacity in 2015, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 6, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail
.php?id=25272 [https://perma.cc/6HRD-QHQN]; FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N,
OFFICE OF ENERGY PROJECTS ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE UPDATE (2017), https://
www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/2017/nov-energy-infrastructure.pdf
[https://perma
.cc/ZBZ9-8NNM] (projecting retirement of an additional 20 gigawatts (GW) of coalfired capacity by 2020, compared to 92 GW of new natural gas-fired capacity, 72
GW of new wind capacity, and 43.5 GW of new solar capacity in the same
timeframe). Reduced demand for coal-fired power is a consistent trend over the
past decade. Power Sector Coal Demand Has Fallen in Nearly Every State Since
2007, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 28, 2016), http://wnew.www.eia.gov/
todayinenergy/detail.php?id=26012 [https://perma.cc/F4AB-WLHW]. Additional
coal retirements were announced as this Article was in the editing process. Rye
Druzin, Texas Coal Plant to Shut Down by 2020, HOUS. CHRONICLE (Sept. 25,
2018, 11:28 AM), https://www.chron.com/business/energy/article/Texas-coal-plant-to
-shut-down-by-2020-13255710.php [https://perma.cc/3LX3-7N8J]; Robert Walton,
FirstEnergy to Retire More Than 4 GW of PJM Coal Plant Capacity, UTIL. DIVE
(Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/firstenergy-to-retire-more-than4-gw-of-pjm-coal-plant-capacity/531300/ [https://perma.cc/F9WH-865H].
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primarily market and technological changes that undercut
coal’s dominance in the electricity sector. 68
Existing nuclear power plants in competitive markets also
struggled with the quick change in market prices. 69 The Kewaunee Power Station in Wisconsin and the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station in Vermont were the first nuclear units to
cite low natural gas prices as a primary factor in decisions to
retire nuclear power plants. 70 Six additional nuclear plants are
scheduled to retire by 2026, and Exelon has indicated that it
will retire the Three Mile Island facility in Pennsylvania unless
it receives support to make the plant financially viable. 71 Even
nuclear power plants that remain economically viable are facing the expiration of their federal operating permits within a

68. See Sam Kalen, Coal’s Plateau and Energy Horizon?, 34 PUB. LAND &
RES. L. REV. 145, 147–48 (2013).
69. See STEVE CLEMMER ET AL., THE NUCLEAR POWER DILEMMA: DECLINING
PROFITS, PLANT CLOSURES, AND THE THREAT OF RISING CARBON EMISSIONS 1
(Nov. 2018), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2018/11/NuclearPower-Dilemma-full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6JX-6W7H] (citing “the economic
challenges brought on by cheap natural gas, diminished demand for electricity,
falling costs for renewable energy, rising operating costs, and safety and
performance problems” as the primary factors causing early retirement of nuclear
power plants in the United States); EDWARD KEE, NUCLEAR ECON. CONSULTING
GROUP, THE FUTURE OF U.S. NUCLEAR POWER 2–3, 13 (2017), https://www.eia.gov
/conference/2017/pdf/presentations/edward_kee.pdf [https://perma.cc/HN88-RT96]
(attributing in part the inability of some nuclear power plants to remain open in a
competitive market to a failure of the market).
70. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Plant Closure in 2014 Will Challenge New
England Energy Markets, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 6, 2013), https://www.
eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=12851 [https://perma.cc/9UVC-QJ7G] (citing
low electricity prices, low capacity market prices, and high operating costs as
factors leading to the retirement of Vermont Yankee); Matthew L. Wald, As Price
of Nuclear Energy Drops, a Wisconsin Plant Is Shut, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/08/business/energy-environment/kewaunee-nuclearpower-plant-shuts-down.html [https://perma.cc/43G2-BSDV]. Two additional nuclear plants retired in 2013 due to maintenance issues. Matthew L. Wald, Nuclear
Plants, Old and Uncompetitive, Are Closing Earlier Than Expected, N.Y. TIMES
(June 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/15/business/energy-environment/
aging-nuclear-plants-are-closing-but-for-economic-reasons.html [https://perma.cc/
A4BZ-BFHQ].
71. Three Mile Island Is the Latest Nuclear Power Plant to Announce
Retirement Plans, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 13, 2017), https://www.eia.gov
/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=31612 [https://perma.cc/3QNC-UM86] (“In the announcement of its plan to retire Three Mile Island, Exelon noted that the plant
had not been profitable for the past five years, and they sought subsidies from
Pennsylvania to provide the financial support necessary to keep the plant open.”).
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decade and thus must soon determine whether to undertake
the investments required to secure a license extension. 72
Of all of the changes facing the sector, the rapid decline of
natural gas prices is the most important driver of the dramatic
transition underway in the electricity sector. 73 Prior to the
shale gas revolution, natural-gas-fired turbines were inexpensive to construct but costly to operate due to the high cost of
natural gas compared to other fuels relied upon for electricity
generation. 74 As a result, natural-gas-fired generation was generally limited to providing power during periods of higher electricity demand—peak load. 75 Efficient extraction of shale gas
quickly changed the equation.
According to the Department of Energy:
The increased use of natural gas in the electric sector has
resulted in sustained low wholesale market prices that reduce the profitability of other generation resources important to the grid. The fact that new, high-efficiency natural gas plants can be built relatively quickly, compared to
coal and nuclear power, also helped to grow gas-fired
generation. Production costs of coal and nuclear plants remained somewhat flat, while the new and existing, more
flexible, and relatively lower-operating cost natural gas
plants drove down wholesale market prices to the point that
some formerly profitable nuclear and coal facilities began
operating at a loss. 76

72. See Krysti Shallenberger, FPL’s Turkey Point Becomes First Nuclear Plant
to Seek Second License Renewal, UTIL. DIVE (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.utility
dive.com/news/fpls-turkey-point-becomes-first-nuclear-plant-to-seek-second-licenserenew/516441 [https://perma.cc/Q5CA-RDQ8].
73. Natural gas prices have historically been volatile. Projections of sustained
low prices, rather than short-term drops in prices, are the critical factor here.
Future U.S. Electricity Generation, supra note 63.
74. See Tyler Hodge, EIA Forecasts Natural Gas to Remain Primary Energy
Source for Electricity Generation, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Jan. 22, 2018),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=34612 [https://perma.cc/BM543K33].
75. See Average Utilization of the Nation’s Natural Gas Combined-Cycle
Power Plant Fleet Is Rising, U.S. ENERGY INFO ADMIN. (June 9, 2011), https://
www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=1730
[https://perma.cc/3G2Q-Q796]
[hereinafter Average Utilization of the Nation’s Natural Gas].
76. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, STAFF REPORT TO THE SECRETARY ON ELECTRICITY
MARKETS AND RELIABILITY 13 (2017), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017
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While the impacts of shale gas extraction were largely unanticipated during initial state debates over restructuring, it is
no accident that natural gas is playing a larger role in the electricity sector. 77 Increasing natural gas generation was a key
goal of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 and of electricity restructuring, and these federal and state measures expanding opportunities for competition opened the door for shale gas to eventually play a transformative role. 78
State and federal responses to these changing market conditions focus on delaying retirements of certain facilities by implementing new payments for particular attributes. A growing
number of states with restructured electricity sectors are responding to the threat of early retirement of nuclear power
plants by implementing new requirements that distribution
companies (monopolies operating local electricity grids) purchase ZECs from nuclear power plants that are unable to outcompete other generation sources in competitive wholesale
markets. 79 These programs seek to achieve state environmental policy goals as well as protect jobs at the existing facili-

/08/f36/Staff%20Report%20on%20Electricity%20Markets%20and%20Reliability_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EA7P-C3DE].
77. Peter Navarro, A Guidebook and Research Agenda for Restructuring the
Electricity Industry, 16 ENERGY L.J. 347, 353 (1995) (“New and improved low-cost,
high heat rate, combined cycle natural gas plants are now competitive with
traditional large central station plants—at least at today’s natural gas prices.
While we shall question in far more detail below whether these natural gas plants
truly spell the death of natural monopoly in the generation market, the current
conventional wisdom is that they do. This claim is a primary basis for the overall
restructuring efforts.”).
78. See, e.g., Sean Casten, No Longer Cheap—So What Next?, 53 FORT.
SPARK 1 (2008) (noting that FERC-facilitated market liberalization helped
incentivize independent power producers to invest in natural gas-fired generation). The anticipated role of new natural gas generation was primarily to
provide power during periods of peak electricity demand rather than direct
competition with the coal and nuclear power plants that historically provided
baseload power—generation that consistently runs to provide power at all times
during the day. See Average Utilization of the Nation’s Natural Gas, supra note 75
(“[T]he low cost of coal relative to natural gas until recent years favored the use of
coal-fired generating units to fulfill baseload electricity demand, leading plant
operators to run these units at rates close to their output capacity during peak
demand hours. During off-peak hours, such as overnight, coal plants generally
continued to operate.”).
79. DANIEL SHEA & KRISTY HARTMAN, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES,
STATE OPTIONS TO KEEP NUCLEAR IN THE ENERGY MIX 25 (Jan. 2017),
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/energy/StateOptions_NuclearPower_f02
_WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4PL-72U4].
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ties. 80 At least one state—Ohio—has also considered implementing new subsidies for supporting coal-fired power plants.81
The Trump administration justifies its proposed payments to
nuclear power plants and coal-fired power plants under the
guise of compensation for their unique reliability and resiliency
attributes. 82
State ZEC programs and the Trump administration’s proposals are motivated by very different concerns and based on
very different degrees of data and analysis. The New York Public Service Commission (New York PSC), for example, implemented ZECs as part of a comprehensive effort to redesign the
state’s electricity sector. 83 The Commission determined that it
would be impossible to achieve New York’s climate policy goals
if three in-state nuclear power plants retired early because
carbon-emitting natural-gas-fired power plants would likely replace the carbon-free generation from the nuclear facilities. 84
80. See S.B. 2814, 99th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2016) (citing the purpose of the zero
emission credit program).
81. Peter Maloney, Feud of the Year: Nuclear and Coal Vs. Competitive
Markets, UTIL. DIVE (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/feud-of-theyear-nuclear-and-coal-vs-competitive-markets/508266/ [https://perma.cc/K2YS-SBJ9]
(“Companion bills in Ohio, HB 239 and SB 155, would provide perpetual subsidies
for two coal-fired plants: the 1,100 MW Kyger Creek in Cheshire and the 1,300
MW Clifty Creek in Madison, Indiana jointly owned by a group of utilities that
includes American Electric Power, FirstEnergy and Duke Energy.”).
82. Letter from Rick Perry, Sec’y, Dep’t of Energy, to Neil Chatterjee et al.,
Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n (Sept. 28, 2017), https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017
/09/f37/Secretary%20Rick%20Perry%27s%20Letter%20to%20the%20Federal%20
Energy%20Regulatory%20Commission.pdf [https://perma.cc/QY7N-HX88]. For
examples of the opposition to the Department of Energy proposal, see Gavin Bade,
‘FERC Did Its Job:’ Former Regulators, Lawyers Laud DOE NOPR Rejection,
UTIL. DIVE (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/ferc-did-its-jobformer-regulators-lawyers-laud-doe-nopr-rejection/514394/ [https://perma.cc/KB6U
-GGCL]; Joshua S. Hill, US Energy Industry Associations Urge FERC to Reject
DOE Proposal to Subsidize Coal & Nuclear, CLEANTECHNICA (Nov. 8, 2017),
https://cleantechnica.com/2017/11/08/us-energy-industry-associations-urge-fercreject-doe-proposal-subsidise-coal-nuclear/ [https://perma.cc/5XTL-QRGM]; David
Roberts, Rick Perry’s Plan to Subsidize Coal and Nuclear Plants Is Bonkers, VOX
(Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/10/4/16407278
/rick-perry-doe-plan-coal-nuclear-energy-markets [https://perma.cc/HX2E-F4GP].
83. Order Adopting a Clean Energy Standard, Case No. 15-E-0302, at 3, 13–
14 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Aug. 1, 2016), http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/
Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId=%7b44C5D5B8-14C3-4F32-8399-F5487D6D8F
E8%7d [https://perma.cc/4RRK-TZZY] [hereinafter N.Y. Clean Energy Standard
Order].
84. Id. at 19 (“Based on current market conditions, losing the carbon-free
attributes of this generation before the development of new renewable resources
between now and 2030, would undoubtedly result in significantly increased air
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In contrast, the Trump administration has provided little
defensible evidence that reliability concerns justify its proposals. 85 Reliability is a concern in some areas of the country,
but one that system operators, market participants, and federal regulators generally agree is manageable as older coal and
nuclear plants retire. 86 Furthermore, the Trump administration’s narrow definitions of resiliency and ability to qualify for
payments exclude other strategies for maintaining system reliability such as energy storage, expanded transmission systems,
demand response, and other existing generation options.
While these market interventions are fundamentally
different in many respects, they share similarities that are important for the future trajectory of the electricity sector. State
ZEC programs and federal proposals to subsidize coal and nuclear plants each seek to rescue existing power plants that are
no longer competitive due primarily to low natural gas prices. 87
Efforts to ensure the profitability of specific power plants
effectively create a hybrid version of the rate-setting model
that states rejected when they moved to break up the vertically
integrated electric monopolies in the first place.
The following subsections describe ZECs and the Trump
administration proposals in greater detail, identifying key elements of each strategy.
emissions due to heavier reliance on existing fossil-fueled plants or the
construction of new gas plants to replace the supplanted energy.”).
85. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 76 (failing to find evidence
that grid reliability required subsidizing economically vulnerable coal-fired power
plants).
86. See Jared Anderson, PJM Finds FirstEnergy Nuclear Plants Can Retire
Without Threatening Reliability, S&P GLOBAL PLATTS (Apr. 30, 2018),
https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/electric-power/043
018-pjm-finds-firstenergy-nuclear-plants-can-retire-without-threatening-reliability
[https://perma.cc/T5PQ-3AZ8]; Rachel Fakhry & Toba Pearlman, Analysis: Illinois
Does Not Need the Dynegy-Vistra Fleet, NRDC (May 16, 2018), https://www.
nrdc.org/experts/rachel-fakhry/analysis-illinois-does-not-need-dynegy-vistra-fleet
[https://perma.cc/T8CB-RW2Z]. See generally MARK SPECHT & LAURA WISLAND,
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, TURNING DOWN THE GAS IN CALIFORNIA,
TECHNICAL APP. (Aug. 2018), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/
2018/08/Turn-Down-Technical-Appendix.pdf [https://perma.cc/FF32-GYE2].
87. See Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Trump Prepares Lifeline for Money-Losing Coal
Plants, BLOOMBERG (May 31, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2018-06-01/trump-said-to-grant-lifeline-to-money-losing-coal-power-plants-jhv94ghl
[https://perma.cc/5MRT-YMPH]; see also Jessica Bayles, New York’s New Renewable Energy Standard, NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.natlaw
review.com/article/new-york-s-new-renewable-energy-standard [https://perma.cc/
5R3W-GMTE].
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State Efforts to Support Existing Nuclear Generation

The New York PSC implemented the first ZEC program in
2016 as part of the state’s Clean Energy Standard. 88 The program requires that load-serving entities (i.e., entities delivering
electricity to retail consumers in the state) purchase ZECs from
three nuclear power plants in the state. 89
The Commission justified the ZEC requirements as the
only alternative to realistically meet the state’s greenhouse gas
emission reduction targets. The New York PSC estimates a $4
billion benefit in the first two years of the ZEC program, compared to a cost of $1 billion. 90 According to the Commission,
neither energy efficiency improvements nor increased renewable energy generation could replace the zero-carbon generation
provided by the state’s existing nuclear power plants. 91
The state’s climate goals are not the sole motivation behind the ZEC requirements, however. The Clean Energy Standard also cites “maintaining existing jobs” as another benefit of

88. N.Y. Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 83, at 1. In addition to
ZECs, the Clean Energy Standard established a renewable energy target of fifty
percent by 2030. Id. at 76.
89. REC and ZEC Purchasers, N.Y. STATE ENERGY RES. & DEV. AUTH.,
https://www.nyserda.ny.gov/All-Programs/Programs/Clean-Energy-Standard/REC
-and-ZEC-Purchasers (last visited Jan. 21, 2018) [https://perma.cc/7KE8-C26F].
The number of ZECs are capped at the historic generation of the state’s
FitzPatrick, Ginna, and Nine Mile Point nuclear facilities. N.Y. Clean Energy
Standard Order, supra note 83, at 145.
90. Jeffrey Tomich & Saqib Rahim, Exelon Girds for Challenges to Cuomo’s
N.Y. Nuclear Subsidy, E&E NEWS (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.eenews.net/
stories/1060041817 [https://perma.cc/73Q6-7AF5] (citing figures from the July 8,
2016 New York PSC proposal).
91. N.Y. Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 83, at 126–27 (“[I]t is
simply unrealistic to assume that sufficient additional energy efficiency measures
could be identified and implemented in time to offset the 27.6 million MWh of
zero-emissions nuclear power that would need to be replaced per year . . . . As in
the case of energy efficiency, it is not realistic to assume that sufficient additional
renewable resources at a reasonable price or perhaps any price could be identified
and implemented in sufficient time to offset the 27.6 million MWh of zeroemissions nuclear power per year.”).
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the new requirements. 92 According to a 2017 report, New York
has 110,582 jobs in the energy efficiency sector. 93
New York’s ZEC program has not been without controversy. Opponents of the New York ZEC program brought suit,
citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2016 decision Hughes v. Talen,
to argue that the New York approach was preempted by the
Federal Power Act. 94 The Hughes Court considered a Maryland
law that aimed to incentivize construction of a new naturalgas-fired power plant within the state. 95 The Court determined
that the Federal Power Act preempted the state law because
Maryland relied on a “contract for differences” approach to incentivize construction of the new facility. 96 Maryland committed to subsidizing the new power plant, but the prices paid to
the new facility were tied directly to the PJM capacity market
clearing prices. 97 The Supreme Court found that this direct
link amounted to Maryland attempting to govern interstate,
wholesale electricity transactions—a realm exclusively reserved for FERC. 98
Rather than linking ZEC prices directly to NYISO market
prices, the New York approach relies on the federal government’s social cost of carbon for pricing the ZECs. 99 Illinois and
Connecticut subsequently implemented their own versions of
ZEC requirements. 100 New Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsylvania are
considering following suit by implementing their own subsidy
programs for existing nuclear units. 101
92. Id. at 7, 46–47. The ZEC requirements have been criticized due to the cost
per protected job. One estimate puts the cost per job at $303,000, paid by New
York’s ratepayers. Michael Kuser, NY Legislators Frustrated by Lack of Answers
at ZEC Hearing, RTO INSIDER (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.rtoinsider.com/cuomoadministration-nuclear-plants-zecs-hearing-39787/ [https://perma.cc/EM7E-3RJS].
93. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 2017 U.S. ENERGY AND JOBS REPORT STATE
CHARTS 194 (2017), https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/01/f34/2017%20US%20
Energy%20and%20Jobs%20Report%20State%20Charts%202_0.pdf [https://perma.cc
/EM7E-3RJS].
94. Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 906 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2018).
95. Hughes v. Talen, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1294 (2016).
96. Id. at 1297.
97. Id. at 1298.
98. Id.
99. N.Y. Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 83, at 150.
100. Illinois’ Future Energy Jobs Act, 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)
(2018); 2017 Conn. Acts 17-3 (Spec. Sess.).
101. Scott DiSavino, N.J. Governor Christie Eyes Nuclear Power Subsidies,
Sparks Criticism, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news
/us/articles/2017-12-08/nj-governor-christie-eyes-nuclear-power-subsidies-sparkscriticism [https://perma.cc/F2TF-T7S3].
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The New York and Illinois ZEC requirements have each
survived court challenges. 102 In both cases, opponents of the
ZEC approach presented three main arguments against the
state program: (1) the ZEC programs interfere with FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction over wholesale sales by “effectively replacing” the FERC-regulated wholesale price, (2) the programs distort FERC-regulated market outcomes and thus conflict with
FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction, and (3) the discriminatory nature of the programs violates the dormant Commerce
Clause. 103 The Second and Seventh Circuits found that the
New York and Illinois ZEC programs, respectively, were
sufficiently different from the facts in Hughes because there
was no direct link between the state programs and the
wholesale RTO markets. 104
B.

Federal Efforts to Support Existing Coal and Nuclear
Generation

The Department of Energy took a different tack on the nuclear retirement issue, proposing subsidies for nuclear and
coal-fired power plants. 105 The Department of Energy’s 2017
Proposed Grid Resiliency Rule instructed FERC to consider
compensating these two categories of facilities for their reliability and resiliency attributes. 106 The proposal defined resiliency
attributes as the ability to store fuel on-site, thus excluding
natural gas and renewable energy facilities. 107
The proposed rule was subject to widespread criticism. 108
As already noted, the rule was not necessary to ensure grid
102. Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 906 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2018); Elec.
Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, 904 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2018).
103. Star, 904 F.3d at 522; Zibelman, 906 F.3d at 46.
104. Zibelman, 906 F.3d at 51–52; Star, 904 F.3d at 523–24.
105. See Devin Henry, Energy Dept. Report Aims to Boost Coal, Nuclear Power,
HILL (Aug. 23, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/347730-energydept-report-aims-to-boost-coal-nuclear-power [https://perma.cc/DH84-7U7M]; U.S.
DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 76.
106. Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, 18 C.F.R. pt. 35 (2017). The Department of
Energy claimed that the proposed rule would “protect the American people from
energy outages expected to result from the loss of this fuel-secure generation.” Id.
at 46941. The Department of Energy has authority to propose rules that FERC
must then consider. Id.
107. Id.
108. Gavin Bade, Moniz on DOE NOPR: ‘No Identification of a Public Good,’
UTIL. DIVE (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/moniz-on-doe-noprno-identification-of-a-public-good/514700/ [https://perma.cc/C4TR-563F] (quoting
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reliability. Analysis of the 2014 polar vortex—an event that
Energy Secretary Perry cited as evidence of the need for a grid
resiliency rule—showed that coal-fired power plants did not
perform consistently during the low temperatures. 109 More recently, electricity grids remained online during a week-long period of low temperatures in January 2018. 110 Further undermining the Department of Energy’s rationale for the proposed
rule, “coal-fired facilities accounted for nearly half of all forced
outages in PJM” during the January 2018 cold snap, and a
nuclear power plant in ISO-NE was removed from service.111
Even the Department of Energy’s own analysis of the reliability
needs of the electricity grid, published one month prior to the
release of the proposed rule, did not conclude that continued
operation of coal-fired power plants was necessary for system
reliability. 112
FERC declined to pursue the Department of Energy’s proposed price supports. 113 Nevertheless, the Department of Energy’s proposed rule remains an important signal regarding the
future trajectory of electricity markets. At least one commissioner indicated that he was willing to support the proposed
rule, and FERC committed to continue examining reliability
concerns. 114
former Department of Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz as saying there was “no
identification of a public good that merited putting the extra cost on the system”);
Steven Mufson, Bipartisan Group of Former FERC Commissioners Rejects Energy
Secretary’s Bid to Help Coal Plants, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/10/19/former-ferc-commis
sioners-reject-energy-secretary-perrys-bid-to-help-coal-plants/
[https://perma.cc/
H2NT-WJWC].
109. See PJM, ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONAL EVENTS AND MARKET IMPACTS
DURING THE JANUARY 2014 COLD WEATHER EVENTS 4 (May 8, 2014), https://www.
pjm.com/~/media/library/reports-notices/weather-related/20140509-analysis-ofoperational-events-and-market-impacts-during-the-jan-2014-cold-weather-events.
ashx [https://perma.cc/URF2-NJK4].
110. Susan Miller, 2018 Begins with Record Cold, as Arctic Weather Puts Some
New Year’s Plans on Ice, USA TODAY (Jan. 1, 2018, 1:39 AM), https://www.usa
today.com/story/news/2018/01/01/2018-begins-record-cold-arctic-weather-puts-some
-new-years-plans-ice/993997001/ [https://perma.cc/E565-6N9Z].
111. Order Terminating Rulemaking Proceeding, Initiating New Proceedings,
& Establishing Additional Procedures re Grid Reliability & Resilience Pricing,
162 FERC ¶ 61,012, at 3 (2018) (Glick, Comm’r, concurring) [hereinafter Grid
Reliability and Resilience Pricing].
112. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 76.
113. Grid Reliability & Resilience Pricing, supra note 111.
114. Id. at 17; Julia Pyper, DOE Official: Agency ‘Confident’ FERC Will
Approve a Coal, Nuclear Pricing Rule, GREENTECH MEDIA (Nov. 14, 2017), https://
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After FERC rejected the Department of Energy proposal,
the Trump administration reframed the issue as a grid emergency and a national security concern, invoking provisions of
the Federal Power Act and Defense Production Act. 115 A leaked
White House memorandum argued that natural gas and petroleum are more vulnerable to national security threats than nuclear and coal because pipelines could be easily disrupted by
cyber or physical attacks. 116 According to the memorandum,
fuel diversity can help combat this vulnerability. In particular,
the memorandum argues that coal and nuclear facilities are
less likely to have fuel supply issues, are more capable of ensuring consistent generation, and are capable of storing fuel onsite. 117
According to the memorandum, the retirement of coal and
nuclear plants “undermin[es] the security of the electric power
system because the system’s resilience depends upon those resources.” 118 In addition to arguing for the resiliency benefits of
coal and nuclear power, the memorandum emphasizes that nuclear provides strategic and security benefits to the United
States because of the military’s dependence upon the civilian
nuclear industry to support military and strategic uses of nuclear. 119
As of the publication of this Article, the Trump administration has not released an official order instructing the Department of Energy to pursue these strategies. Nonetheless, Secretary Perry adopted the national security framing in his advocacy
for subsidizing coal and nuclear facilities and testified before
Congress that market intervention to support economically vul-

www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/doe-confident-ferc-will-dutifully-consideradopt-coal-nuclear-rule [https://perma.cc/4Q7A-ZS9V] (stating interim FERC
Chairman, Neil Chatterjee, has said he is “sympathetic” to the rule). But see
Bipartisan Former FERC Commissioners, Comment Letter on Proposed Grid
Resiliency Pricing Rule (Oct. 19, 2017), https://s3.amazonaws.com/dive_static/pay
chek/Comments_of_BFFC_Docket_RM18-1_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/24H8-FU97].
115. Dlouhy, supra note 87.
116. Draft Addendum in Support of Dep’t of Energy Action 8–9 (May 29, 2018),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4491203-Grid-Memo.html [https://perma.cc/
RH8H-VJR4].
117. Id. at 11–12.
118. Id. at 2.
119. Id. at 21.
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nerable coal and nuclear power plants “is exactly what has to
happen.” 120
Dismissing the federal effort due to the lack of evidence to
support its purported purpose risks obscuring the underlying
point that shifting markets elicit political responses. 121 The
Trump administration’s attempts to frame the debate around
issues of grid reliability and affordability mask the value judgments underlying state and federal responses to changing market conditions. These are proxy battles over core issues of state
autonomy, economic development, responses to climate change
and other environmental challenges, fuel choices, and the future trajectory of the electric grid.
III. RETHINKING COMPETITION IN TRADITIONALLY REGULATED
STATES
Traditionally regulated states are not immune to the factors leading restructured states to reconsider the role of competition. Notably, some of the same challenges that led states to
initially consider restructuring are present in today’s traditionally regulated states. 122 Low natural gas prices and flat demand growth have resulted in coal plant retirements—and
thus job losses—in these states, as well. 123 Falling prices for renewable energy technologies and demands for more choice in
electricity generation by residential and commercial stakeholders have led some of these states to also reconsider the role of
competition in their electricity sectors.
Traditionally regulated states have more options to soften
the impacts and extend the transition period by setting rates
that avoid stranded assets and unwanted plant closures.
Therefore, if state policy requires a reduction in greenhouse gas
120. Gavin Bade, Perry: Emergency Order for Coal, Nukes Is ‘Exactly What Has
to Happen’, UTIL. DIVE (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/perryemergency-order-for-coal-nukes-is-exactly-what-has-to-happen/521250/
[https://
perma.cc/LWH7-F3NS].
121. See David B. Spence, Naïve Energy Markets, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 973,
981 (2017) (explaining that politics and subsequent statutes passed have greatly
influenced the energy market over the years).
122. See Ethan Howland, The Four Greatest Challenges Utilities Face in 2014,
UTIL. DIVE (Dec. 9, 2013), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/the-four-greatestchallenges-utilities-face-in-2014/202574/ [https://perma.cc/9T9S-CXDF].
123. Drew Haerer & Lincoln Pratson, Employment Trends in the U.S.
Electricity Sector, 2008–2012, 82 ENERGY POL’Y 85 (2015) (finding that the coal
industry lost almost fifty thousand jobs during the five-year study period).

7. MONAST_ (DO NOT DELETE)

694

4/10/2019 11:39 AM

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

emissions and accepts that maintaining existing nuclear power
plants is a cost-effective tool for helping the state achieve that
goal, the PUC may set rates that ensure the economic viability
of the in-state fleet of nuclear units. By contrast, PUCs in competitive markets have limited options for doing so (e.g., approving higher priced contracts between load-serving entities and
nuclear facilities).
Despite the ability to achieve some policy goals via rate
setting, some traditionally regulated states are grappling with
the same challenges of overinvestment and poor risk management that plagued the sector in the 1970s and 1980s. 124 The
most glaring examples come from South Carolina, Georgia, and
Mississippi. South Carolina is grappling with a financial fallout
after the recent cancellation of the VC Summer nuclear project
in the state. The two lead utilities had invested approximately
$9 billion in the project by the time of cancellation. 125 Southern
Company will continue building two new nuclear units at its
Plant Vogtle site in Georgia, despite the fact that the project is
nearly five years behind schedule and the projected cost is $27
billion—almost twice the original projected cost. 126 Mississippi
Power, a Southern Company subsidiary, opted not to complete
the coal gasification portion of the Kemper County project that
was supposed to gasify coal mined on-site and then capture 65
percent of the carbon emissions. 127 Shareholders will bear the
majority of the costs, but ratepayers will still pay $2.5 billion
for what is now a 582 MW natural-gas-fired plant, far exceeding the cost of conventional natural gas combined-cycle
units. 128
124. See, e.g., Kristi E. Swartz, Skyrocketing Costs Bury Southern Co., E&E
NEWS: ENERGYWIRE (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060050444
[https://perma.cc/3VNL-TYDS] (discussing rate increases in Mississippi and
Georgia).
125. Brad Plumer, U.S. Nuclear Comeback Stalls as Two Reactors Are
Abandoned, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/31/
climate/nuclear-power-project-canceled-in-south-carolina.html [https://perma.cc/
2PHS-MYZJ].
126. See Robert Walton, Vogtle Nuclear Construction to Continue, Southern Co.
Says, UTIL. DIVE (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/vogtle-nuclear
-construction-to-continue-southern-co-says/503977/ [https://perma.cc/WS87-XJKP].
127. Megan Geuss, $7.5 Billion Kemper Power Plant Suspends Coal
Gasification, ARS TECHNICA (June 28, 2017), https://arstechnica.com/informationtechnology/2017/06/7-5-billion-kemper-power-plant-suspends-coal-gasification/
[https://perma.cc/VVP5-HR9E].
128. David Wagman, The Three Factors That Doomed Kemper County IGCC,
IEEE SPECTRUM (June 30, 2017), https://spectrum.ieee.org/energywise/energy/

7. MONAST_ (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

ELECTRICITY COMPETITION

4/10/2019 11:39 AM

695

All three states have laws allowing utilities to charge ratepayers during the construction phase for high-cost, high-risk
projects. 129 These laws—generally referred to as “Construction
Work In Progress,” or CWIP, shift risks associated with the
projects from the utilities and their investors to ratepayers,
risks with which ratepayers in South Carolina, Georgia, and
Mississippi are now all too familiar. 130 As of December 2018,
the South Carolina state legislature is going so far as to propose reversal of the cost recovery allowed by the state’s Baseload Review Act in the aftermath of the canceled construction
of two new nuclear units at the VC Summer facility. 131
Numerous factors contributed to the approval of CWIP cost
recovery for the Kemper County, Vogtle, and VC Summer projects. Each project was justified in part by the risk of high gas
prices, the prospect of federal climate policy increasing costs for
conventional fossil-fuel-fired generation, and expectations of
high electricity demand. 132 These factors did not materialize,
thus calling into question the robustness of the risk assessments and the PUCs’ willingness to approve expensive longterm projects to hedge these risks. 133 The unforeseen shifts in
energy markets also had direct impacts on the current economics of the projects. 134 For example, had Congress adopted
federal climate legislation and natural gas prices remained
high, the South Carolina utilities may have decided to proceed
with the VC Summer project despite the cost overruns. The VC
fossil-fuels/the-three-factors-that-doomed-kemper-county-igcc
[https://perma.cc/
2Z23-8T48]. In 2016, the Energy Information Administration estimated that the
construction cost of a conventional natural gas combined cycle power plant was
$978/kw. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., CAPITAL COST ESTIMATES FOR UTILITY
SCALE ELECTRICITY GENERATING PLANTS 7 (2016), https://www.eia.gov/analysis
/studies/powerplants/capitalcost/pdf/capcost_assumption.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
2NC4-G448]. At that price, the cost of constructing a conventional 582 MW facility
would be approximately $570 million.
129. Base Load Review Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-33-210 (2017); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 77-3-101 (2018); Georgia Nuclear Energy Financing Act, GA. CODE ANN.
§ 46-2-25 (2018).
130. See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 13, at 848.
131. Avery G. Wilks, SCE&G ‘Unlikely’ to Go Bankrupt if Rates Slashed After
Nuclear Debacle, Reports Says, STATE (Jan. 19, 2018), http://www.thestate.com/
news/politics-government/article195667359.html [https://perma.cc/Y9WG-QMXF].
132. See Monast, supra note 27, at 149–56 (discussing the risk hedging allowed
by the PUC decisions as a positive development in PUCs interpreting their “least
cost” mandates broadly enough to consider the risk of higher costs associated with
future environmental regulations).
133. See, e.g., Plumer, supra note 125.
134. Id.
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Summer and Vogtle projects were also impacted by the unanticipated bankruptcy of Westinghouse, the lead contractor for
construction of the projects and the developer of the reactor design. 135
Critics of vertically integrated utilities may view the VC
Summer, Vogtle, and Kemper projects as expected outcomes
when there is a lack of competitive pressures restraining utilities’ willingness to undertake risky projects. There is a reason
that construction of the nation’s new nuclear units was initiated in traditionally regulated states rather than restructured
states. Companies operating in competitive markets would not
invest in projects with such long construction times and high
construction costs. CWIP does not eliminate risk for the utility.
Southern Company shareholders are bearing approximately
$6.4 billion of the cost of the gasification portion of the Kemper
County facility that Mississippi Power now says it will not operate due to technical malfunctions and the need for additional
expenditures that it would not be able to recover through
rates. 136 The challenges associated with stranded assets and
cost overruns may extend beyond these high-profile examples,
depending on how the electricity sector evolves. 137
Without diminishing the validity of these critiques, the experimentation between different state regulatory approaches is
also demonstrating the benefits of the cost-of-service approach
in an uncertain investment climate. If state policy calls for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and the PUC accepts that
keeping existing nuclear facilities online is a cost-effective
strategy for achieving the emissions goal, the commission can
135. See Tom Hals & Emily Flitter, How Two Cutting Edge U.S. Nuclear
Projects Bankrupted Westinghouse, REUTERS (May 2, 2017), https://www.reuters
.com/article/us-toshiba-accounting-westinghouse-nucle/how-two-cutting-edge-u-snuclear-projects-bankrupted-westinghouse-idUSKBN17Y0CQ [https://perma.cc/
U8AJ-Y9N2].
136. See Darrell Proctor, Regulators Back Settlement for Costs of Failed
Kemper IGCC Project, POWER (Feb. 6, 2018), http://www.powermag.com/
regulators-back-settlement-for-costs-of-failed-kemper-igcc-project/ [https://perma.
cc/8ANG-A4FY]; Wagman, supra note 128.
137. See, e.g., Emily Hammond & Jim Rossi, Stranded Costs and Grid
Decarbonization, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 645, 663 (2017) (discussing the relationship
between decarbonization policies and stranded assets); see also JOACHIM SEEL ET
AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., IMPACTS OF HIGH VARIABLE RENEWABLE
ENERGY FUTURES ON WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY PRICES, AND ON ELECTRICSECTOR DECISION MAKING (2018), https://emp.lbl.gov/publications/impacts-highvariable-renewable [https://perma.cc/WSY3-5ZZF] (considering the impact of high
versus low penetration of variable renewable energy on the electricity grid).
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set rates that allow the nuclear facility to continue operating.
The PUC may also adjust rates, including via CWIP rate recovery if allowed by state law, to facilitate investments in innovative technologies—the types of projects that may be necessary
if the nation is to achieve the aggressive level of emission reductions needed to mitigate catastrophic climate change—that
are less likely to occur without certainty regarding cost recovery. 138 Risky innovative energy projects like nuclear energy,
carbon capture and storage, and offshore wind corridors are
important elements of realizing a low-carbon energy future,
and cost recovery is an important aspect of promoting these
technologies. 139 Cost recovery through cost-of-service rate setting is a mechanism for doing so. 140
Policymakers in some traditionally regulated states are
seeking a new balance between competition and monopoly to
respond to recent developments in electricity markets and consumer demands. Some states are seeking to retain the monopoly structure while creating limited openings for third parties
to compete with utilities, and others are considering new efforts to break up electric utility monopolies. The remainder of
this section focuses on three such examples: North Carolina’s
new competitive procurement process for solar energy generation, Nevada’s law allowing energy users to exit the monopoly’s
exclusive service territory, and Nevada’s ballot measure on restructuring. 141
A.

Competitive Procurement for Renewable Energy
Generation

A recent North Carolina statute amending the state’s approach to solar energy demonstrates how a state may create

138. Boyd & Carlson, supra note 13, at 848. CWIP as a mechanism is not the
problem. The problem is the disincentive to fully vet risks after the initial decision
to approve CWIP recovery, a lack of oversight that may follow granting of the
CWIP rate recovery, and placing the costs and risks on a relatively small group of
ratepayers. Monast & Adair, supra note 44.
139. S. Pacala & R. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate
Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCIENCE 968 (2004)
(identifying key available technologies for mitigating greenhouse gas emissions).
140. Boyd & Carlson, supra note 13.
141. See 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 192; Assemb. B. 452, 79th Sess. (Nev. 2017).
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new opportunities for competition without rejecting the monopoly-utility model. 142
Three factors led to North Carolina’s ranking as the state
with the second largest amount of installed solar capacity in
the country. 143 The first contributing factor is the federal Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA). 144 Like the laws in
other traditionally regulated states, PURPA requires North
Carolina’s vertically integrated utilities to purchase electricity
generated at “qualifying facilities” or QFs (generally renewable
energy or combined heat and power facilities with a capacity
factor of less than 80 MW) at the utility’s avoided cost (the
amount the utility would otherwise spend to generate or procure the same amount of power). 145
The second factor is the state’s Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard (“REPS”), which requires
that 12.5 percent of electricity sales by the state’s regulated
utilities be generated by renewable energy by 2021. 146 The law
included a specific requirement that a minimum of 0.2 percent
of generation should come from solar energy by 2018. 147
The third factor is a historical holdover. After enactment of
PURPA, but prior to the establishment of the state’s REPS, the
NC Utilities Commission developed a standardized contract

142. See 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 192.
143. North Carolina Has More PURPA-Qualifying Solar Facilities Than Any
Other State, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/today
inenergy/detail.php?id=27632 [https://perma.cc/YR8M-WUTU] [hereinafter North
Carolina Has More PURPA-Qualifying Solar].
144. Id. (As of 2016, “1,173 MW, or 92%, of [North Carolina’s] 1,271 MW
utility-scale PV capacity is certified to have qualifying facility (QF) small power
producer status under PURPA, which is more than any state in both absolute and
percentage terms.”).
145. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e)(1) (2012). “Avoided costs means the incremental
costs to an electric utility of electric energy or capacity or both which, but for the
purchase from the qualifying facility or qualifying facilities, such utility would
generate itself or purchase from another source.” 18 C.F.R. § 292.101 (2018).
146. Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard (REPS), N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 62-133.8(b)(1) (2017). At the time of passage, the state had two
vertically integrated investor-owned utilities (IOUs): Duke Energy and Progress
Energy. The two firms subsequently merged and now operate as a single company
with two distinct service territories: Duke Energy Carolinas and Duke Energy
Progress. Merger of Progress Energy and Duke Energy Created Largest U.S.
Electric Utility, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 22, 2012), https://www.eia.gov/
todayinenergy/detail.php?id=7650 [https://perma.cc/W5WQ-FBWS].
147. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133.8(d).
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that allowed QFs at 5 MW or less to enter into fifteen-year contracts for a fixed avoided-cost rate. 148
Together, these factors led to dramatic growth in 5 MW solar energy facilities, with the majority located in the eastern
part of the state where land is relatively inexpensive but far
away from the areas of higher electricity demand. 149 The utilities found themselves with a queue of five hundred projects
awaiting connection to the grid with little (or no) control over
location or timing of generation. 150 Furthermore, the fifteenyear contracts locked in prices set at the avoided cost at the
time of construction. 151 Because prices for solar panels have
fallen significantly since 2008, and the overall avoided cost has
decreased as Duke Energy shifted to lower-cost natural gas,
utility executives have complained that the standardized contract resulted in higher prices for ratepayers. 152
There are compelling reasons to offer long-term contracts
for renewable energy, as is standard practice in competitive
electricity markets. 153 Because there are no fuel costs and low
maintenance costs, the primary cost for renewable energy facilities is in the construction phase. 154 Thus, renewable facilities provide price certainty, which itself has value for a utility’s
generation mix. 155 Although there is short-term variation in
power output (e.g., decreased solar generation output during
cloudy days), there is general certainty regarding expected av-

148. North Carolina Has More PURPA-Qualifying Solar, supra note 143.
149. See Utility-Scale Solar Powers North Carolina’s Economy, TERRASMART
(May 5, 2017), http://www.terrasmart.com/utility-scale-solar-powers-north-carolinas
-economy/ [https://perma.cc/Z43Y-CLBW].
150. John Downey, New Complaints Contend Duke Energy Is Stalling Grid
Connections for Solar Projects, TRIANGLE BUS. J. (June 19, 2017), https://www.biz
journals.com/triangle/news/2017/06/19/new-complaints-contend-duke-stalling-grid
.html [https://perma.cc/HB65-KGKB].
151. North Carolina Has More PURPA-Qualifying Solar, supra note 143.
152. Bruce Chapman, Duke Energy Says Solar Power Will Cost N.C. Customers
$1 Billion Too Much, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Feb. 24, 2017), http://www.charlotte
observer.com/news/local/article134736169.html [https://perma.cc/BL67-EHRS].
153. Leah B. Chacon, Comment, Long-Term Contracting the Way to Renewable
Energy Investment: Lessons from Brazil Applied to the United States, 62 EMORY
L.J. 1563 (2013).
154. Barriers to Renewable Energy Technologies, UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy/renewableenergy/barriers-to-renewable-energy [perma.cc/7TW2-KJ3K].
155. Benefits of Renewable Energy Use, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
(Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy/renewable-energy/publicbenefits-of-renewable-power [https://perma.cc/Y95C-BPDN].
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erage generation. 156 Long-term contracts also provide price certainty for the companies constructing the solar facilities by allowing access to capital at lower interest rates. 157 Furthermore,
renewable energy contracts can help utilities meet the shifting
demands of its ratepayers. North Carolina, like numerous
other states, aims to attract new employers whose criteria for
site selection include access to clean energy. 158
The utility may appreciate these factors, but they also run
counter to the firm’s primary means of delivering value to its
shareholders. Cost-of-service ratemaking—ensuring that rates
are set at a level that allows the firm to recover the amount
invested in infrastructure as well as a rate of return on those
investments—rewards capital investments by the utility. 159
Electricity purchased from independent power producers is
generally passed on to ratepayers, but utilities do not generally
earn a rate of return on those expenditures. 160
PURPA, the state REPS, and the standardized contract
served as exogenous factors that motivated the utility to seek
changes to the law. A lengthy stakeholder process resulted in
passage of the Competitive Energy Solutions for North Carolina Act (HB 589). 161 The new law includes a competitive procurement process for solar generation, 162 limited opportunities
for third-party leasing, 163 a new community solar program,164 a
156. Barriers to Renewable Energy Technologies, supra note 154.
157. Chacon, supra note 153, at 1611.
158. See Sharon E. Burke, What City Has the Power to Woo Amazon?, SLATE
(Jan. 26, 2018), https://slate.com/technology/2018/01/what-city-has-the-bestenergy-policies-for-amazons-headquarters-search.html
[https://perma.cc/3SWDGZLY].
159. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring the
Electricity Market, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451, 457 (2005).
160. Electric utilities generally earn a rate of return for capital expenditures.
See, e.g., Larry B. Parker et al., Clean Air Act Allowance Trading, 21 ENVTL. L.
2021, 2054 (1991) (“Under traditional rate-of-return regulation, electric utilities
are entitled to have their revenue requirements met by earning a rate-of-return
on capital investments and by recovering necessary operating expenses.”).
161. Robert Walton, North Carolina Passes Solar Reform Bill with 18-Month
Wind Moratorium, UTIL. DIVE (June 30, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/
north-carolina-passes-solar-reform-bill-with-18-month-wind-moratorium [https://
perma.cc/9MEY-RHX3].
162. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-110.8 (2017).
163. HB 589 limits third-party leases the lesser of 1 MW or 100 percent of
contract demand for nonresidential customers, 20 kW or 100 percent of estimated
electrical demand for residential customers, and is intended only to offset the
customer’s electrical consumption at that premises. § 62-126.3(14). Duke Energy
may offer leases. § 62-126.5.
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solar rebate program for residential customers, 165 and revisions
to the standardized contract and to net metering payments.166
The law also provides additional opportunities for market entrants and includes provisions to respond to consumer demands
for renewable energy. Major military installations, the University of North Carolina system, and other large customers may
contract for renewable energy. 167
The key elements of HB 589’s competitive bidding process
include a renewable energy target, a bidding process that allows third parties and the utilities (or their subsidiaries not
subject to rate regulation) to compete, and an independent
monitor to ensure that the utility does not control the process
by exerting market power. These provide a model for additional
competition in traditionally regulated states. 168 The North
Carolina law identifies an aggressive target for new solar
generation—2.6 GW of nameplate capacity (i.e., the maximum
sustained output) over forty five months. 169 Contracts for the
new generation will be offered via a series of annual auctions
monitored by an independent administrator. 170 The bidding
process allows Duke Energy to exert greater control over the
location of new solar generation, presumably prioritizing generation that is closer to the population centers, areas with energyintensive companies such as manufacturing and data centers,
or areas where the grid is able to accept additional generation.

164. § 62-126.8. A community solar facility is a “facility whose output is shared
through subscriptions.” § 62-126.3(3).
165. § 62-155(f).
166. The law instructs Duke Energy to file revised net metering rates for
utility commission approval for customers with leasing arrangements and those
who own distributed solar installations. § 62-126.4. The final version of the law
also imposed an eighteen-month moratorium on new wind generation. 2017 N.C.
Sess. Laws 192, Part XIII.
167. § 62-159.2. Large customers are those with a contract demand equal to or
greater than 1 MW at one site or more than 5 MW in aggregate from multiple
service locations. § 62-159.2(a). HB 589 establishes generation limits as part of
the direct contract provisions. § 62-159.2(c)–(d).
168. The N.C. Utilities Commission will identify the independent market
monitor and promulgate rules governing the monitor’s role. § 62-110.8.
169. Id. Actual generation for a solar facility will be less than the nameplate
capacity. Frequently Asked Questions: What Is the Difference Between Electricity
Generation Capacity and Electricity Generation?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=101&t=3 (last updated Feb. 14, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/PBA8-NEGR].
170. § 62-110.8(d).
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The law allows Duke Energy to develop up to 30 percent of
the target capacity, with the remaining 70 percent reserved for
development by independent companies. 171 Duke Energy can
also purchase facilities constructed by independent companies. 172
As part of the compromise, HB 589 codified new size limitations for eligibility for the standardized contract. Initially,
the size limit shifted from 5 MW to 1 MW. 173 The limit for new
facilities located in a specific utility service territory will shrink
to 100 kW after installation of 100 MW of new projects. 174 The
law also amends the standardized contract by shortening the
length of the fixed avoided-cost rate from fifteen years to ten
years. 175
HB 589 does not supersede PURPA. Duke Energy must
continue to purchase power from new QFs at the avoided-cost
rate set by the state PUC, but the new law incentivizes independent generators to participate in the competitive bidding
process in lieu of the PURPA-mandated avoided-cost rates. 176
Under HB 589, winning bids will qualify for a twenty-year contract for a fixed avoided-cost rate, compared to QFs which
would be compensated at an avoided-cost rate that could vary
over time. 177 The first competitive solicitation closed in October
2018 with winning bids to be announced in March 2019. 178
B.

Allowing Consumers to Exit Utility Service

Recent experience in Nevada demonstrates that large electricity consumers may be willing to pay fines to exit utility
171. § 62-110.8(b)(4).
172. Id.
173. § 62-156(b)(1).
174. Duke Energy has two service territories in North Carolina: Duke Energy
Carolinas or Duke Energy Progress.
175. § 62-110.8(b)(1).
176. See 16 U.S.C. § 2621 (2012).
177. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-110.8(b)(3). These provisions do not apply to swine
and poultry waste facilities. § 62-156(c). These facilities are eligible for terms
longer than five years and expedited interconnection reviews. Id.; § 62-133.8(i)(4).
178. John Downey, Duke Energy Starts Up Bids and Rebates for Solar,
CHARLOTTE BUS. J. (July 10, 2018), https://www.bizjournals.com/charlotte/news/
2018/07/10/duke-energy-starts-up-bids-and-rebates-for-solar.html [https://perma.cc
/M6KF-7DBZ]; Duke Energy Carolinas (DEC) Competitive Procurement of
Renewable Energy Program (CPRE) Request for Proposal (RFP)—600 MW,
ACCION GRP., https://decprerfp2018.accionpower.com/_rfp_1801/calendar.asp (last
visited Oct. 28, 2018) [https://perma.cc/2FSA-EVAN].
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service in exchange for greater access to renewable energy,
creating both a cautionary tale for monopoly utilities and the
motivation to be more responsive to shifting consumer demands. 179 In 2015, the Nevada PUC determined that three
casinos could exit NV Energy’s system (the local monopoly
utility) after paying an exit fee. 180 The opportunity to do so was
created by a 2001 law adopted in the aftermath of the Enron
scandal. 181 Until recently, no companies sought to exit the
utility’s service and the PUC had not clarified the process for
doing so. 182 Switch, a data company located in Las Vegas,
petitioned for the same opportunity as that afforded to the
casinos. 183 The Nevada PUC denied the petition, and Switch
sued for damages and the right to exit the utility. 184 The

179. See, e.g., Sean Whaley, MGM Resorts to Leave Nevada Power, Pay $86.9M
Exit Fee, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (May 19, 2016), https://www.reviewjournal.com/
business/energy/mgm-resorts-to-leave-nevada-power-pay-86-9m-exit-fee/ [https://
perma.cc/64CV-Q8NY]. The prospect of larger electricity purchasers exiting a
utility’s service territory is not limited to the Nevada example. In December, for
example, a Colorado electric cooperative requested that the Colorado PUC
establish an exit charge to allow the co-op to leave the Tri-State Generation and
Transmission Association. See Delta-Montrose Electric Association Files with PUC
Seeking Just and Reasonable Exit Charge from Tri-State, DMEA (Dec. 6, 2018),
http://www.dmea.com/content/delta-montrose-electric-association-files-puc-seeking
-just-and-reasonable-exit-charge-tri [perma.cc/2TAD-U3M7]. The co-op justified
its request on disputes regarding electricity rates and renewable energy
investments. Id.
180. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Nev., Order Approving Application of Wynn Las
Vegas, LLC to Purchase Energy, Capacity, and/or Ancillary Services from a
Provider of New Electric Resources, No. 15–05006 (Dec. 3, 2015); Pub. Util.
Comm’n of Nev., Order Approving Application of Las Vegas Sands Corp. to
Purchase Energy, Capacity, and/or Ancillary Services from a Provider of New
electric Resources, No. 15–05002 (Dec. 3, 2015); Pub. Util. Comm’n of Nev., Order
Approving Application of MGM Resorts International to Purchase Energy,
Capacity, and/or Ancillary Services from a Provider of New Electric Resources,
No. 15–05017 (Dec. 3, 2015); Herman K. Trabish, Major Las Vegas Resorts Get
Price Tag for Grid Defection, UTIL. DIVE (Aug. 21, 2015), https://www.utility
dive.com/news/major-las-vegas-resorts-get-price-tag-for-grid-defection/404372/
[https://perma.cc/Z42B-YG95].
181. NEV. REV. STAT. § 704B (2017).
182. Kyle Roerink, Casinos Have Few Options After PUC Exit Decision, LAS
VEGAS SUN (Dec. 3, 2015), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2015/dec/03/casinoshave-few-options-after-puc-exit-decision/ [https://perma.cc/SJA9-WJCZ].
183. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Nev., Order Denying Application of Switch Ltd. to
Purchase Energy, Capacity, and/or Ancillary Services from a Provider of New
Electric Resources, No. 14–11007 (June 11, 2015).
184. Id.; Switch, Ltd. v. Nev. Power, 2:16-CV-01629 (D. Nev. July 12, 2016);
Daniel Rothberg, Switch Sues PUC, NV Energy for $30 Million in Damages,
Permission to Leave Utility, LAS VEGAS SUN (July 12, 2016), https://lasvegassun
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companies and Nevada PUC Regulatory Operations staff
reached a settlement shortly after Switch filed the lawsuit. 185
As part of the agreement, the utility agreed to construct a 100
MW solar energy facility and provide 100 percent renewable
power to the Switch facility via the new solar facility, geothermal power, and wind power. 186
On October 1, 2016, two major casinos departed NV Energy’s service territory, paying a collective $100 million exit fee
and accepting the prospect of additional fees over a six-year period. 187 Together, these two companies accounted for approximately 6 percent of NV Energy’s electricity demand. 188
Utilities have obvious reasons to resist departure of large
customers. Lower electricity demand means less need for generation. This, in turn, may leave power plants idle and utilities
unable to pay off the facilities. 189 Also, utility rates are volumetric to allow utilities to recover fixed costs. The more demand for electricity, the lower the cost of each unit of electricity.
Electricity demand may decrease due to efficiency improvements or when large consumers meet their demand using independent electricity, but the fixed costs remain constant. The
utility’s remaining ratepayers may also face negative impacts,
as the amount charged per unit of electricity must increase if
utilities are to recover their costs. 190 The Nevada PUC sought
to mitigate rate impacts on the remaining ratepayers, includeing provisions allowing future fees as the true costs of the casinos’ decisions become apparent. Although the fees may prevent
rate increases, the lost revenue may leave the utility with
fewer resources to invest in infrastructure and renewable en-

.com/news/2016/jul/12/switch-sues-puc-nv-energy-for-30-million-in-damage/ [https://
perma.cc/5C7U-9P2D].
185. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Nev., Stipulation to the Application of Switch Ltd. to
Purchase Energy, Capacity, and/or Ancillary Services from a Provider of New
Electric Resources, No. 14–11007 (July 10, 2015).
186. Kyle Roerink, Switch and NV Energy Strike Deal to End Battle, LAS
VEGAS SUN (July 14, 2015), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2015/jul/14/switch-andnv-energy-hash-deal-end-battle/ [https://perma.cc/KS9K-QQGX].
187. Daniel Rothberg, MGM Resorts, Wynn to Stop Purchasing NV Energy
Power Saturday, LAS VEGAS SUN (Sept. 30, 2016), https://lasvegassun.com/news/
2016/sep/30/mgm-resorts-wynn-stop-purchasing-nv-energy-power/ [https://perma.cc/
PMW4-A7MH].
188. Id.
189. See Monast, supra note 27, at 172.
190. See id.
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ergy projects and thus create incentives for other customers to
follow the example of the casinos.
C.

Renewed Efforts to Break Up Vertically Integrated
Monopolies

Following the casinos’ exit, Nevadans approved the Energy
Choice Initiative—a ballot measure to amend the Nevada Constitution to “establish[ ] . . . an open, competitive retail electric
energy market that prohibits the granting of monopolies and
exclusive franchises for the generation of electricity.” 191 Implementation required a second passage in 2018, which voters rejected. 192 If voters had approved the measure a second time, it
would have required the state’s legislature to enact legislation
by July 1, 2023 that restructured the electricity sector and “include[d] provisions to reduce costs to customers, protect against
service disconnections and unfair practices, and prohibit the
granting of monopolies and exclusive franchises for the generation of electricity.” 193
The ballot measure caused energy stakeholders in the
state to grapple with the same issues that have arisen in states
that previously restructured their electricity sectors. NV Energy, the state’s largest electricity provider and a rate-regulated monopoly, released principles that it believed should
guide any restructuring process, including protecting the utility from stranded assets. 194
The Nevada ballot measure is another cautionary tale for
electric utilities. Increased costs arising from cancelled nuclear
power plants in the 1970s and 1980s are viewed as a contributing factor that led states to consider restructuring. 195 Simi191. Barbara K. Cegavske, Secretary of State for the State of Nevada,
Statewide Ballot Questions 2016, at 34 (2016), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/
Division/Research/VoteNV/BallotQuestions/2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6XG-U9U5].
192. Associated Press, Nevadans Approve All but One Statewide Question,
KOLO (Nov. 7, 2018, 12:07 PM), https://www.kolotv.com/content/news/nevadansapprove-all-but-one-statewide-question-499964552.html [https://perma.cc/V45UWGRF].
193. Id.
194. NV ENERGY, NEVADA’S ENERGY FUTURE: KEY PRINCIPLES 2 (2016),
https://www.nvenergy.com/brochures_arch/key-principles.pdf [https://perma.cc/DV
L5-JX54].
195. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, The Political Economy of Energy and Its Implications
for Climate Change Legislation, 84 TUL. L. REV. 379, 406 (2009) (“Price gaps and
cost differentials between different geographic areas changed the incentives for
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lar circumstances now exist in South Carolina, Georgia, and
Mississippi due to cancelled projects and significant cost overruns. Prior to the 2018 election, NV Energy responded to the
threat of the Energy Choice Initiative by committing to double
its renewable energy capacity by 2023 if voters rejected the
proposed change. 196
IV. LESSONS FOR ELECTRICITY-SECTOR COMPETITION
Competition will continue to steer the evolution of the electricity sector in both restructured and traditionally regulated
markets. 197 The questions going forward are what form competition takes and what constraints public policy places on the
scope of competition. 198 Maximizing societal benefits in both restructured and traditionally regulated states depends on recognizing, and mitigating, instances when regulatory and marketdesign choices interfere with public goals.
The range of options available to states and the demonstrated willingness on the part of federal and state officials to
alter market rules highlight the importance of incorporating
social and environmental policy goals into energy markets.
Even if ZECs ultimately fail judicial scrutiny, states can implement a number of measures to influence competitive markets, including “tax credits, land grants, direct subsidies, construction of state-owned generation facilities, or reregulation of
the energy sector.” 199 Power-purchase agreements—bilateral
contracts for electricity—may also skirt broader market cominterest groups—consumers and new entrants, such as independent power
producers—to look for relief beyond the framework of price regulation by state
and local utility commissions.”). According to analysis by Matthew White, states
with modest gaps between retail and wholesale rates would opt to maintain
traditional rate regulation. White, supra note 38, at 238.
196. Robert Walton, NV Energy to Double Renewable Capacity—If Voters Reject
Retail Choice, UTIL. DIVE (June 1, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/nvenergy-to-double-renewable-capacity-if-voters-reject-retail-choice [https://perma.cc
/B5UP-HQPB].
197. Shi-Ling Hsu, Capital Rigidities, Latent Externalities, 51 HOUS. L. REV.
719, 777 (2014) (“Crucial in a shift to a new electricity paradigm is the opening up
of electricity markets to new entrants, and the introduction of competition for
electricity consumers.”); Boyd, supra note 19, at 1635–36.
198. Achieving environmental goals or employment goals via reactive market
changes may lack the support necessary for long-term success if consumers find
themselves paying higher prices for attributes that they were not aware of and
may not agree are worth the cost.
199. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1299 (2016).
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petition. 200 States may seek to reincorporate some power plants
into a utility’s rate base. 201 States may also withdraw their
utilities from RTO markets altogether and return to cost-ofservice rate making, as a power company urged Ohio lawmakers to consider in 2016. 202
On the other end of the electricity-market spectrum, the
Nevada experience demonstrates the potential for voters to demand choices if vertically integrated utilities fail to provide the
benefits available to consumers in restructured states or ratepayers face higher costs due to cancelled projects. The South
Carolina legislature, for example, is considering numerous proposals for allocation of the sunk costs, and some stakeholders
are advocating that the state consider restructuring the electricity sector. 203
This Section discusses four critical lessons for the future of
the electricity sector. First, core societal values continue to
drive electricity-sector policy and will have direct impacts on
the evolution of the sector. Second, case-by-case efforts to support specific existing facilities are resulting in a post hoc costof-service approach without direct PUC oversight of system
needs and rates. While this approach may be justified in some
circumstances, ensuring that market interventions deliver
200. See Elec. Supply Power Ass’n v. FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., 155 FERC
¶ 61,101 (2016); Elec. Power Ass’n v. AEP Generation Res., 155 FERC ¶ 61,102
(2016).
201. See, e.g., Mont. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order No. 7323K, Final Order in
the Matter of the Application of NorthWestern Energy for Hydro Assets Purchase,
No. D2013.12.85, at 4 (Sept. 26, 2014) (Travis Kavulla, dissenting) (discussing the
implications of reincorporating an asset into a utility’s rate base).
202. Elec. Supply Power Ass’n, 155 FERC ¶ 61,101 (2016); Gavin Bade, ReRegulation on the Horizon? State Plant Subsidies Point to Looming ‘Crisis’ in
Organized Power Markets, UTIL. DIVE (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.utilitydive.com/
news/re-regulation-vertically-integrated-utility/428639/
[https://perma.cc/B6FPTZ5J]; Tom Knox, Frustrated AEP CEO: Ohio Should Reverse Energy
Deregulation or We’ll Sell Our Plants; ‘No Interest’ in Prolonged Debate with
FERC, COLUMBUS BUS. FIRST (Apr. 28, 2016), https://www.bizjournals.com/
columbus/news/2016/04/28/frustrated-aep-ceo-ohio-should-reverse-energy.html
[https://perma.cc/B6FP-TZ5J].
203. S. 890, 2018 Leg., 122nd Sess. (S.C. 2018); Avery G. Wilks, Gov.
McMaster’s Lack of Leadership to Blame for Nuclear Crisis, Rival Says, STATE
(Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.thestate.com/news/politics-government/article20503
0769.html [https://perma.cc/74NP-YAPG] (listing electricity sector deregulation as
part of a Republican gubernatorial candidate’s platform); How to Free South
Carolina’s Energy Market, S.C. POL’Y COUNCIL (Apr. 9, 2014), https://www.sc
policycouncil.org/research/taxes/energy-deregulation [https://perma.cc/E7FY-PWGG]
(advocating that the state “completely deregulate the energy industry”).
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social benefits requires explicit consideration of the economic
and environmental tradeoffs. Third, ZEC programs and the
Trump administration’s proposed subsidies are reactions to
electricity prices falling below the level necessary to deliver
social benefits. Without proactive measures to help communities weather economic impacts and ensure that states achieve
environmental goals, reactive, case-by-case responses will
likely continue. Finally, policymakers in traditionally regulated
states may harness market forces to deliver new benefits to
ratepayers without rejecting the monopoly utility model.
A.

Enduring Value Choices

Electricity regulation has reflected important value choices
since the emergence of the electric utility in the early 1900s.204
Initial oversight focused primarily on the core pillars of affordability, reliability, and nondiscriminatory access. These factors
continue to define the role of state PUCs and FERC. 205
Over time, society has added expectations to these core
objectives, such as economic development, protecting public
health, mitigating climate change, incentivizing innovation,
and fostering consumer choice. 206 This range reflects the sector’s broad societal impacts. Reducing emissions results in
cleaner air. 207 Affordable electricity rates may be a key criterion for incentivizing economic development. 208 Jobs created by
204. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 81 (1930).
205. Monast, supra note 27, at 141–42 (describing the role of the PUC). These
self-described economic regulators focus primarily on rate design for efficient
achievement of these goals.
206. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 76, at 11 (“Society places value on
attributes of electricity provision beyond those compensated by the current design
of the wholesale market.”).
207. See, e.g., Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global
Environmental Regulation, 87 GEO. L.J. 749, 752 (1999) (“Clean air is a classic
example of a public good.”); Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, Public Goods
and Economic Development (July 27, 2004) (manuscript later published in
UNDERSTANDING POVERTY (Abhijit Vinayak Banerjee et al. eds., 2006)),
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/GHATAK/public.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SK7-YDYM]. But
see Hsu, supra note 197, at 775 (“[E]conomic development generally has detracted
from what should be the focus of government provision and subsidization: public
goods.”).
208. See, e.g., Bob Mayti, Heartland Incentive Rate Sows Economic
Development Seeds, AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.public
power.org/periodical/article/heartland-incentive-rate-sows-economic-developmentseeds [https://perma.cc/V464-UFSW] (crediting an economic development incentive
rate as contributing to economic growth).
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construction and operation of large power plants also lay the
foundation for delivery of public goods afforded by increased
wealth in communities. 209 Improvements in energy efficiency
may reduce household energy bills and produce health benefits. 210 Mitigating climate change (a classic public goods challenge) will deliver economic and environmental benefits on a
broader scale. 211
The shifting dynamics of electricity markets are undermining public policy goals. Lost jobs associated with operating
the plants and, in the context of coal-fired power plants, the
impacts on production and transport of coal are causing significant local economic impacts. 212 In some communities, the
power plants are among the largest employers. 213 Although increased construction of renewable energy facilities and infrastructure investments are mitigating net energy job losses, the
209. Louis Kaplow, Public Goods and the Distribution of Income (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9842, July 2003), https://www.nber.org/
papers/w9842 [https://perma/cc/DNL8-264L].
210. 3 Health Benefits to Weatherizing Your Home, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFF.
OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY (Oct. 26, 2017), https://energy.gov/
eere/articles/3-health-benefits-weatherizing-your-home [https://perma.cc/5FFN-JJ9F].
211. Climate Action Benefits: Key Findings, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/cira/
climate-action-benefits-key-findings (last visited Dec. 9, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
Y528-ZWHV]. Markets are now achieving a similar level of decarbonization as
would have been required had the 2009 Waxman-Markey Bill become law. In
other instances public goods are a direct result of operational choices by electricity
sector participants. For example, frequency regulation that is a critical component
of reliability has been characterized as a public good. See, e.g., WILLIAM SCHULTZE
ET AL., FACILITATING ENVIRONMENTAL INITIATIVES WHILE MAINTAINING
EFFICIENT MARKETS AND ELECTRIC SYSTEM RELIABILITY, FINAL PROJECT
REPORT, PSERC DOCUMENT 09-9, at 6 (Oct. 2009), https://certs.lbl.gov/sites/all/
files/pserc-facilitating-environ-initiatives-2009.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A453-9E4V]
(citing voltage maintenance as a public good); Lynne Kiesling & Michael
Giberson, Presentation on Electric Network Reliability as a Public Good at
Carnegie Mellon University Conference on Electricity Transmission in
Deregulated Markets (Dec. 15–16, 2004), https://www.ece.cmu.edu/~electriconf/
2004/Kiesling%20Giberson%20-%20Reliability%20as%20a%20Public%20Good%20
2004NOV15.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7K2-L7C4]; Paul Joskow & Jean Tirole,
Reliability and Competitive Electricity Markets 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 10472, May 2004) (“[Electricity] system collapses . . . create a
rationale for network support services with public goods characteristics.”).
212. See James Van Nostrand, Why the U.S. Coal Industry and Its Jobs Are
Not Coming Back, YALE ENV’T 360 (Dec. 1, 2016), https://e360.yale.edu/features/
why_us_coal_industry_and_its_jobs_are_not_coming_back [https://perma.cc/E9CG
-RLX4] (explaining many reasons for why lost coal jobs are not coming back).
213. See Justin Worland, Coal’s Last Kick, TIME (Mar. 18, 2017),
http://time.com/coals-last-kick/ [https://perma.cc/G3C6-33BB] (describing how the
severe impact of lost coal jobs in West Virginia is due to the strong reliance on the
industry).
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different locations of the newer jobs and the different expertise
required for those jobs means that the opportunities are often
not interchangeable. 214
Early retirement of nuclear power plants also directly impacts electricity-sector greenhouse gas emissions. For example,
emissions in the ISO-NE service territory rose 7 percent after
the closure of the Vermont Yankee nuclear facility, halting a
trend of falling emissions in the region. 215
Some observers may be tempted to dismiss ZECs and
Trump administration proposals as simply rent seeking by influential firms and political maneuvering by elected officials
concerned about the electoral impacts of plant closures. There
is evidence to support these claims. 216 Subsidies for economically vulnerable nuclear and coal-fired power plants result in
higher electricity prices for ratepayers and benefit only a few
facilities in a state. 217 A single company owns many of the
facilities that benefit from the ZEC requirements and has been
advocating for financial support for its nuclear power plant for
years. 218

214. See Nadja Popovich, Today’s Energy’s Jobs Are in Solar, Not Coal, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/25/climate/
todays-energy-jobs-are-in-solar-not-coal.html [https://perma.cc/4H3L-4UEH] (providing maps of and information on where different types of energy jobs are being
created in the United States).
215. William Opalka, CO2 Emissions Increase in ISO-NE: Loss of Nuclear
Plant Reverses Trend, RTO INSIDER (Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.rto
insider.com/co2-new-england-22278 [https://perma.cc/82M7-DVEK] (“CO2 emissions in ISO-NE had declined 26% from 2001 through 2014.”).
216. There is an argument that the price supports for the Millstone plant in
Connecticut are pure rent seeking. According to an MIT study, the Millstone plant
is among the most profitable nuclear facilities operating in competitive markets.
Geoffrey Haratyk, Early Nuclear Retirements in Deregulated U.S. Markets:
Causes, Implications and Policy Options 6 (MIT Ctr. for Energy & Envtl. Policy
Research, Working Paper No. 2017-009, Mar. 2017). The governor has ordered the
state to conduct its own analysis of the facility’s financial viability. Conn. Exec.
Order No. 59 (July 25, 2017), https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/32CB330A0E0B415284
EB60E71C54C1A6.pdf [https://perma.cc/MB2A-SX4Y].
217. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, No. 17 CV 1163-64, 2017 WL 3008289,
at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2017); Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 272 F.
Supp. 3d 554, 562–63 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
218. N.Y. Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 83; Tomich & Rahim,
supra note 90 (stating that Exelon will receive an estimated $500 million
annually from ZEC payments). Exelon has engaged in a years-long lobbying effort
in Illinois to win state subsidies. See Jeffrey Tomich, Bill to Save Exelon Nuclear
Plants Proposes Vast Rewrite of Ill. Law, E&E NEWS (Nov. 16, 2016),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060045842 [https://perma.cc/C7ZE-Y4ZY].
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The Trump administration’s claims that coal and nuclear
subsidies are required to ensure reliability are even more susceptible to the rent seeking and political posturing criticisms.
President Trump has made no secret of his intent to pursue his
campaign promise to protect coal-related jobs. 219 If implemented, the administration’s efforts will also benefit a small
number of established market participants and hinder market
actors that are benefitting from current energy prices.
Yet, characterizing these efforts as raw politics or rentseeking fails to appreciate the forces that laid the groundwork
for the alleged rent seeking to be successful. 220 Despite their
differences, ZECs and the Trump administration proposals are
responses to economic impacts and, in the case of ZECs, environmental impacts caused by the unanticipated shifts in energy markets. These responses are important reminders that
policymakers will continue to intervene in electricity markets
when those markets are not achieving core social and political
goals. As Professor David Spence observed in 2008, restructured energy markets cannot survive without political support
and obvious near-term benefits. 221
B.

Hybrid Cost-of-Service Interventions

The current suite of state ZEC requirements contribute to
state decarbonization goals by supporting economically vulnerable nuclear power plants. The New York Clean Energy Standard, for example, explicitly links the supply of ZECs to the
historic electricity output at three economically vulnerable nuclear power plants but withholds ZEC payments for the state’s
fourth nuclear facility because it was deemed financially viable. 222 In Connecticut, the new ZEC requirements aim to keep
219. Darryl Fears, Trump Promised to Bring Back Coal Jobs. That Promise
‘Will Not Be Kept,’ Experts Say., WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/03/29/trump-promised-tobring-back-coal-jobs-that-promise-will-not-be-kept-experts-say/
[https://perma.cc/
2FDH-TBG7].
220. See Spence, supra note 121, at 981 (explaining that politics and
subsequent statutes passed have greatly influenced the energy market over the
years).
221. Spence, supra note 29, at 795.
222. See N.Y. Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 83, at 130, 155–57; see
also Scott DiSavino, N.Y. Regulators Approve Clean Energy Standard with
Nuclear Subsidies, REUTERS (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/usnew-york-nuclear-idUSKCN10C2Z6 [https://perma.cc/EM2P-JGPB].
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one nuclear facility operational. 223 Like New York, the Illinois
ZEC payments support two facilities that would otherwise retire but do not apply to nuclear units that are financially
sound. 224 These approaches are not substantially different from
traditional PUC rate cases, wherein state commissions determine the revenue requirements of regulated utilities and set
rates at a level that allows utilities to remain financially
viable. 225 In both instances, power plant operators receive compensation at a level sufficient to cover operating expenses and
provide a level of profits for the firms.
The similarities between market interventions in competitive electricity markets and traditional PUC rate cases do not
mean that the interventions are unjustified. For example, the
New York PSC estimates a $4 billion benefit in the first two
years of the ZEC program, primarily in terms of mitigating
greenhouse gas emissions, compared to a cost of $1 billion. 226
Based on this analysis, direct compensation for low-carbon
baseload generation is a cost-effective strategy to achieve nearterm state decarbonization goals. 227 Furthermore, state measures to prevent early retirement of key nuclear power plants
may be the only viable strategy to meet the goals. 228

223. See Peter Maloney, Dominion’s Millstone Nuclear Plant Could Warrant
Subsidies, Draft Report Says, UTIL. DIVE (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.utility
dive.com/news/dominions-millstone-nuclear-plant-could-warrant-subsidies-draftreport-s/515406/ [https://perma.cc/7V3W-X57Z].
224. Vill. of Old Mill Creek v. Star, No. 17 CV 1163–64, 2017 WL 3008289
(N.D. Ill. July 14, 2017); Nuclear Plants Account for More than Half of Electricity
Generation in Illinois, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN. (May 5, 2017),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=31092 [https://perma.cc/EH8CEKNN] (noting that Exelon announced plans to retire two nuclear power plants in
Illinois but canceled the plans after the state enacted the ZEC program);
Complaint at 2–3, Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d 554
(S.D.N.Y. 2017); S.B. 2814, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2016).
225. See Monast, supra note 27, at 145 (“[T]he rates must allow utilities to
recover costs that were prudently incurred, maintain the financial integrity of the
firm, compensate equity investors for the risks they assume, and enable the firm
to attract needed capital.”).
226. Tomich & Rahim, supra note 90 (citing figures from the July 8, 2016 New
York PSC proposal).
227. N.Y. Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 83.
228. Id. at 19 (“[L]osing the carbon-free attributes of this generation before the
development of new renewable resources between now and 2030 would
undoubtedly result in significantly increased air emissions due to heavier reliance
on existing fossil-fueled plants or the construction of new gas plants to replace the
supplanted energy.”).
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Although this article presents ZECs as a case study on the
motivations for post hoc market interventions, ZEC implementation also provides a model for incorporating a cost-of-service
approach into competitive markets. The New York PSC implemented ZEC requirements after a lengthy and detailed process.
The PSC retains oversight of the program and may adjust it if
necessary. The ZEC payments are directly related to pre-existing state decarbonization goals and the PSC determined that
ZECs are the only viable option to achieve those goals. The
program delivers additional benefits, such as job protection for
power plant employees. These measures suggest criteria for determining whether market interventions are necessary and justifying the costs imposed on ratepayers and other market participants.
The White House proposals, on the other hand, demonstrate the potential to abuse the strategy of compensating power plants for particular attributes (e.g., on-site fuel supplies).
As discussed above, these proposals purportedly seek to maintain a reliable electricity sector but are instead motivated by
campaign promises and rapid shifts in the economics of coalfired power plants. The Trump administration’s efforts are not
necessary to ensure a reliable electricity system, and there is
little evidence to support the claims that a grid emergency is
imminent if existing coal and nuclear power plants retire.
Even in instances where a post hoc cost-of-service approach is justified, there are financial, social, and environmental tradeoffs that government officials should consider before
intervening. 229 Companies operating in competitive markets
make investments based on existing market rules and reasonable expectations about the future. When policymakers implement subsidies to prevent plant retirements that would otherwise occur due to market dynamics, the generation sources that
otherwise would outcompete the subsidized plants may lose
market share, or at least fail to gain market share after nuclear facilities retire. 230 Ratepayers will also face higher costs.
229. See New York Electricity Supply Costs to Increase in 2017–PSC Approves
Clean Energy Standard, Subsidizes Upstate Nuclear Power, ENERGY WATCH (Aug.
3, 2016), https://energywatch-inc.com/new-york-electricity-supply-costs-increase2017-psc-approves-clean-energy-standard-subsidizes-upstate-nuclear-power/ [https://
perma.cc/JB3J-N5KW].
230. Saqib Rahim & Jeff Tomich, Dynegy Forges On in Turbulent Power
Markets, CEO Says, E&E NEWS: ENERGY WIRE (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.ee
news.net/energywire/2018/02/01/stories/1060072589 [https://perma.cc/8LFD-BCPS].
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For example, Bloomberg projects an annual cost of up to $3.9
billion if all nuclear power plants in the Northeast and MidAtlantic states—all states relying on RTO-managed competitive electricity markets—receive subsidies at the same level as
those currently available in New York. 231
Furthermore, subsidizing economically vulnerable power
plants in competitive markets could constrain the role of
emerging energy options, such as utility-scale storage. 232 In
contrast to emissions markets, which allow market participants to determine the lowest cost strategy to comply with
emission limits, compensating existing power plants for certain
attributes does not incentivize other actors to take steps to reduce emissions or improve reliability.
A dissenting opinion in a 2014 Montana PSC decision to
reincorporate a hydroelectric facility into a utility’s rate base
highlights another concern with requiring supplemental compensation to protect power plants in competitive electricity
markets. As then-chair of the PSC stated:
The Commission’s Order turns the free market on its
head. . . . The proposition that underlies this business transaction then, is simple: The government (i.e., this Commission) is severing the bond between an asset’s performance
relative to the market and the revenues the asset’s owner
will earn. In so doing, the Commission unencumbers the
shareholders of the merchant utility from a risk and authorizes a generous payment to them. At the same time, the
Commission redistributes that risk (which has never gone
away, only moved) by socializing it to the monopolized customer base of the regulated utility. . . .
231. Jonathan Crawford, U.S. Consumers May Be $3.9 Billion ‘Losers’ From
Nuclear Aid, BLOOMBERG MKTS. (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2017-03-21/consumers-would-be-3-9-billion-losers-from-nuclear-subsidies
[https://perma.cc/ZUC3-B4U6].
232. Cost-effective utility scale storage projects are beginning to emerge. For
example, a recent Xcel solicitation for a storage project returned an “unprecedented” response, with some prices falling well below the cost of storage power
purchase agreements finalized in 2017. Robert Walton, Xcel Solicitation Returns
‘Incredible’ Renewable Energy, Storage Bids, UTIL. DIVE (Jan. 8, 2018), https://
www.utilitydive.com/news/xcel-solicitation-returns-incredible-renewable-energystorage-bids/514287/ [https://perma.cc/TQL7-EWRA] (“Wind energy with battery
storage was bid at $21/MWh, just $3 higher than wind-only. In [a 2017] Arizona
deal . . . the addition of storage added about $15/MWh to the power purchase
agreement bid.”).
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There are few precedents for a government to do what we
are doing. Only a relatively short time after the divestiture
of this property to the free market, we are marching back in,
removing it and its production from the marketplace, and
shackling it to a captive set of customers at a substantial
mark-up from its book value (an “acquisition premium” in
the phraseology that has been presented to us). 233

The same critique applies to the Trump administration’s
proposed subsidies. Even though the subsidies would not reincorporate power plants into a utility’s rate base, they would
shift risk from power plant operators to ratepayers and other
market participants.
Furthermore, federally imposed market subsidies forgo the
benefit of oversight by a system operator or PUC. Regional
transmission operators (RTOs) 234 and utility commissions consider power plant compensation in light of overall system
needs. The approaches have flaws, as described above. Nonetheless, there is a common set of criteria applied to questions of
power plant value and compensation.
C.

Implicit Market Floors for Economic and
Environmental Goals

Efforts to ensure the economic viability of existing nuclear
and coal-fired power plants in competitive electricity markets
expose two gaps created by low wholesale electricity prices: job
protection and environmental protection. Had prices remained
high enough to keep the nuclear (and in the case of the Department of Energy’s proposed rule, coal-fired) facilities operating,
price supports presumably would not be in place at the state
level or proposed at the federal level. This suggests that there
is an implicit market floor for the provision of social goods in
competitive electricity markets—that is, a price point below
which electricity markets are no longer delivering certain
public goods that society expects of the electricity sector.
Viewed in this light, ZECs are an attempt by state officials to

233. Mont. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n, supra note 201, at 3–4.
234. RTOs oversee transmission systems and oversee auctions in competitive
electricity markets.
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increase revenue for the plants deemed necessary to ensure the
provision of the social benefits.
Floor prices arise in other market design contexts. 235 For
example, the California Cap-and-Trade Program and the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) carbon market in
the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions seek to incentivize
investments in low-carbon infrastructure by increasing the cost
of emitting greenhouse gases. Low allowance prices may fail to
motivate investments in low-carbon infrastructure and thus
undermine the public policy goals of such market design programs. The California and RGGI markets address this issue by
establishing price floors for their allowance auctions. 236
RTO capacity auctions also rely on floor prices to ensure
that the economic signals are sufficient to ensure the future
reliability of their respective grids. 237 The market floors for capacity auctions and carbon markets illustrate a key risk associated with low market prices—without a sufficient price to incentivize construction and maintenance of power plants, the
grid may not be able to meet future demand. This point receives less attention in public debates than does the risk of
high prices and may seem counterintuitive when the primary
argument in favor of competitive markets is the potential for
competition to result in lower prices.
The unanticipated economic vulnerability of nuclear power
plants in competitive electricity markets and the subsequent
efforts by states and the U.S. Department of Energy to provide
235. Floor prices are commonly used in auctions. See, e.g., Steven L. Good &
Celeste M. Hammond, Real Estate Auctions—Legal Concerns for an Increasingly
Preferred Method of Selling Real Property, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 765, 776–
77 (2006) (describing the use of auction reserves in real estate auctions).
236. In the RGGI context, the focus is exclusively on electricity generation.
Elements of RGGI, RGGI INC., http://www.rggi.org/design/overview (last visited
Nov. 11, 2018) [https://perma.cc/EZ75-L58Y]. The California market covers
additional sectors. CAL. AIR RES. BD., CAP-AND-TRADE INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDANCE,
CHAPTER 2: IS MY COMPANY SUBJECT TO THE CAP-AND-TRADE REGULATION? 20–
22 (2012), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/guidance/chapter2.pdf [https://
perma.cc/BP54-CGNJ]. Carbon markets may seek to achieve other social goals as
well, such as funding investments in innovative technologies or mitigating price
impacts for certain populations, locations, or economic sectors. See Carbon Market
Cooperation, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, https://www.edf.org/climate/carbon-marketcooperation (last visited Feb. 23, 2018) [https://perma.cc/V76F-QJCC].
237. See, e.g., Markets: Results of the Annual Forward Capacity Auctions, ISONE, https://www.iso-ne.com/about/key-stats/markets (last visited Feb. 4, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/SP69-GEER] (listing floor prices for annual forward capacity
auctions).
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additional payments to keep the plants operational point to a
minimum price necessary to provide social goods. This is not to
suggest that there is, or should be, a specified minimum price
for electricity in competitive markets. It does, however, demonstrate the intersection between social goals and market dynamics. The ZEC programs and the economic shifts underlying the
Trump administration’s proposals expose the risk to competitive electricity markets if policymakers and grid operators fail
to proactively address social and environmental concerns.
The remainder of this subsection outlines two alternate
strategies for mitigating energy-related job losses and achieving long-term environmental protection goals: building on the
precedent of competitive transition charges implemented during the initial state restructuring process and incorporating a
carbon price directly into RTO auctions.
1. Addressing Employment Impacts of Retiring
Power Plants
Job losses resulting from changes in competitive electricity
markets represent a new wave of social costs resulting from restructuring. During the initial restructuring process, states
made policy choices to ensure the continued provision of public
goods resulting from an affordable and reliable electricity sector. 238 Local distribution companies (also referred to as loadserving entities or LSEs) inherited the utilities’ duty to serve
all customers within their respective service territories.239
Some states implemented temporary limits on retail rates postrestructuring and established programs to assist low-income
residents. 240 PUCs retained authority to oversee system reliability. 241
238. Rossi, supra note 39, at 1294–95.
239. See id.
240. See Barbara R. Alexander, Managing Default Service to Provide Consumer
Benefits in Restructured States: Avoiding Short-Term Price Volatility, U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (June 2003), https://liheapch.acf.hhs.gov/pubs/defserv
intro.htm [https://perma.cc/4X9V-S2R9].
241. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of State Util. Consumer Advocates, Comment on
Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric Reliability Organization; and
Procedures for the Establishment, Approval and Enforcement of Electric
Reliability Standards, Second Technical Conference, Docket No. RM05-30-000, at
6 (Dec. 9, 2005), http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20051209103606-Popowsky,
%20NASUCA.pdf [https://perma.cc/XG8N-TB6A] (“[E]ven in a restructured state
such as Pennsylvania, it can be seen that the state General Assembly believed
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The approach to stranded asset recovery is a particularly
instructive model for addressing job losses. Requiring utilities
to divest themselves of generation assets presented the risk
that the firms and their investors would not recover the full
value of investments once deemed prudently incurred by the
state PUC. 242 Although many utilities would have had strong
legal claims if states had denied recovery of any stranded costs,
it is not clear that they would have recovered the full value of
the undepreciated power plants. 243
As Steve Isser notes, stranded asset recovery was a political response as well as a legal one.
Utility consultants tried to portray the issue as one of economic efficiency and legal rights rather than as a political
question of how to distribute the cost of a socially desirable
transition in market structure. Ostensibly, the recovery of
stranded costs reflected states accepting their obligations
under the “regulatory compact,” in lieu of being forced to
honor their agreements by the courts. 244

Rather than fight the issue in courts, states implemented
competitive transition charges (CTCs) to allow recovery of the
stranded costs through retail rates collected by the local distribution companies. 245 Recoverable stranded costs included “reg-

that the state PUC would continue to exercise its authority to maintain the
reliability of all facets of electricity service.”). RTOs, FERC, and the National
Electricity Reliability Council play important roles in ensuring system reliability.
See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENSURING ELECTRICITY SYSTEM RELIABILITY,
SECURITY, AND RESILIENCE 4-4 (2017), https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/
02/f34/Chapter%20IV—Ensuring%20Electricity%20System%20Reliability%2C%20
Security%2C%20and%20Resilience.pdf [https://perma/cc/42LX-PBNK].
242. See Portland Gen. Elec. Co., Oregon Pub. Util. Comm’n Order No. 95-322
(1995).
243. See William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, Stranded Cost Recovery: Fair
and Reasonable, FORTNIGHTLY MAG. (May 15, 1995), https://www.fortnightly.com/
fortnightly/1995/05-0/stranded-cost-recovery-fair-and-reasonable [https://perma.cc/
SQU6-XA2H].
244. ISSER, supra note 20, at 201. Social outcomes included protecting
investors, including pension funds.
245. See, e.g., Walter R. Hall II, Securitization and Stranded Cost Recovery, 25
ENERGY L.J. 173, 191–92 (2004) (describing Pennsylvania’s competitive transition
charge); Scott B. Finlinson, The Pains of Extinction: Stranded Costs in the
Deregulation of the Utah Electric Industry, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 173, 205
(describing California’s competitive transition charge); Alan Miller & Adam
Serchuk, The Promise and Peril in a Restructured Electric System, 12 NAT.
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ulatory assets, the diminished value of generating plant assets,
above-market purchase power contracts and costs required to
renegotiate or buy out certain contracts.” 246
Job losses and impacts on local economies are another social cost of restructuring, and states could utilize the CTC
model to provide job retraining, funds for economic development, pension funding, and other societal needs in the aftermath of plant closings. 247 In some locations, retiring plants are
the largest employers. 248 Electricity-sector job losses may also
extend throughout the supply chain, impacting rail companies
that transport coal and communities dependent upon coal mining. 249 Coal mining communities in the Appalachian states, for
example, suffer from some of the worst poverty rates in the
country. 250 Funding for job retraining and economic development in those areas could not only contribute to local economies but also produce the social benefits associated with poverty alleviation. 251
An employment-focused Energy Transition Charge would
also address an important political challenge presented by competitive electricity markets. Leaving decisions regarding plant
closure to market forces rather than PUC rate setting exposes
employees at power plants, as well as employees throughout
the power plants’ fuel supply chain, to job loss in the event of
RESOURCES & ENV’T 118, 149 (1997) (describing California’s competitive
transition charge).
246. Tom Lumsden et al., Electric Utility Deregulation Creates Winners &
Losers What’s the Effect on Utilities’ Financial Statements, 1999 AM. BANKR. INST.
J. 26, 26.
247. Other closely related models are also available, such as the system
benefits charge that some states implemented to “fund public policy initiatives not
expected to be adequately addressed by . . . competitive electricity markets.”
System Benefits Charge, N.Y. STATE DEP’T PUB. SERV., http://www3.dps.ny.gov/W/
PSCWeb.nsf/All/58290EDB9AE5A89085257687006F38D1 (last updated June 3,
2014) [https://perma.cc/34ZM-QCCK].
248. See Tom Henry, FirstEnergy Executive: Davis-Besse Plant Headed for
Premature Closure, BLADE (Jan. 26, 2018), http://www.toledoblade.com/business/
2018/01/25/FirstEnergy-executive-Davis-Besse-plant-headed-for-premature-closure
.html [https://perma.cc/5QWP-93M4].
249. Haerer & Pratson, supra note 123, at 90.
250. See Andria Caruthers, Mapping Poverty in the Appalachian Region,
CMTY. COMMONS (Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.communitycommons.org/2016/08/
mapping-poverty-in-the-appalachian-region [https://perma.cc/6XV3-E7NY].
251. See Parija Kavilanz, How This Kentucky Coal Town Is Trying to Bring Its
Economy Back to Life, CNN MONEY (Nov. 8, 2017, 8:05 AM), http://money.cnn.
com/2017/11/08/news/economy/hazard-kentucky-coal-jobs/index.html [https://perma.
cc/5ADE-Q5QD].
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changing market forces. 252 The Department of Energy’s Proposed Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule and “War on Coal” rhetoric
during the Obama Administration and 2016 election shine a
bright light on the economic, political, and environmental impacts of ignoring job losses resulting from rapid shifts in the
electricity sector. 253
2. Meeting State Environmental Protection Goals
ZEC programs demonstrate the central role of environmental protection in electricity markets. 254 State energy and
environmental mandates operating in parallel with electricity
markets is nothing new. Even as states moved to restructure
their electricity markets, they were also implementing renewable portfolio and energy efficiency standards to promote clean
energy technologies. 255 The California Cap-and-Trade Program
and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative impose carbon
prices on electricity generators, impacting their relative competitiveness in electricity markets. 256 These market-based strategies complement other state and federal environmental regulations. 257
If the courts uphold the ZEC program design and market
prices continue to fall below the level necessary to maintain (or
incentivize construction of) facilities necessary to meet ZEC
program goals, states may increasingly turn to price supports
to correct what they perceive as market gaps. If the courts ul252. See M. Scott Niederjohn, Regulatory Reform and Labor Outcomes in the
U.S. Electricity Sector, 126 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 10, 14–18 (May 2003); see also
Russell Gold, At Modern Utilities, Jobs Go Up in Smoke, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16,
2018, at B1.
253. See, e.g., Gavin Bade, Trump Touts End of ‘War on Beautiful, Clean Coal’
in State of the Union, UTIL. DIVE (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/
news/trump-touts-end-of-war-on-beautiful-clean-coal-in-state-of-the-union/516000
[https://perma.cc/WMR6-FASR]; Michael Grunwald, Inside the War on Coal,
POLITICO (May 26, 2015), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/05/insidewar-on-coal-000002 [https://perma.cc/CUD6-7HNH] (“The industry and its supporters use ‘war on coal’ as shorthand for a ferocious assault by a hostile [Obama]
White House.”).
254. See, e.g., N.Y. Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 83, at 2.
255. Ryan Wiser et al., Assessing the Costs and Benefits of US Renewable
Portfolio Standards, 12 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 2 (2017).
256. California Air Board Approves Controversial Greenhouse Gas Cap-andTrade Rules, MARTEN LAW (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/
20111102-calif-ghg-cap-and-trade-rules [https://perma.cc/U2UG-8RFZ].
257. Id.
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timately overturn ZEC requirements, these same states may
pursue their environmental and energy policies via other measures that are less directly linked to RTO market prices. 258
The Federal Power Act’s “just and reasonable” standard
provides FERC sufficient discretion to allow RTO markets to
incorporate a carbon price into their rate setting mechanisms. 259 Energy markets already reflect compliance costs for
existing environmental regulations. Neglecting to anticipate
changes in environmental policy has direct impacts on the cost
of electricity. 260 Furthermore, RTOs and utilities already include carbon prices in their long-term planning, reinforcing the
view that mitigating the risk of future environmental regulations is an important component of electricity-sector management. 261
While states may conclude that subsidizing certain uncompetitive existing facilities is necessary to achieve climate policy
goals, this strategy is less efficient than a broad market signal
incentivizing low carbon investments. New York’s ZEC program is based on the Obama administration’s assessment of
the social cost of carbon. 262 Although ZECs act as a type of carbon price, they function differently than a carbon market such
as RGGI. ZECs focus on maintaining viability for a small number of specific facilities. 263 In the case of New York, only three
facilities will receive ZEC price supports. 264 Carbon pricing via
sector-wide cap-and-trade programs or carbon taxes creates
incentives for a much broader group of market participants to

258. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1299 (2016) (noting
state options to promote electricity policy goals).
259. Peskoe, supra note 40, at 12–15; STEVEN WEISSMAN & ROMANY WEBB,
BERKELEY CTR. FOR L. ENERGY AND ENV’T & BERKELEY ENERGY AND CLIMATE
INST., ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE WITHOUT LEGISLATION, VOL. 2: FERC 10–
13 (2014).
260. Jonas Monast & David Hoppock, Designing CO2 Performance Standards
for a Transitioning Electricity Sector: A Multi-Benefits Framework, 44 ENVT’L L.
REP. 11068, 11073 (2014); Peskoe, supra note 40.
261. JIM LAZAR & DAVID FARNSWORTH, REG. ASSISTANCE PROJECT,
INCORPORATING ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS IN ELECTRIC RATES 35 (Oct. 2011),
https://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/rap-lazarfarnsworth-incor
poratingenvironmentalcostsinelectricrates-2011-10.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NLL2QTHH].
262. Shelley Welton, Electricity Markets and the Social Project of Decarbonization, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1067, 1087 (2018).
263. See N.Y. Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 83, at 156–57.
264. Id.
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move away from higher-emitting generation and incentivizes
investments in lower-emitting options. 265
Proactively addressing environmental goals could also help
states mitigate other impacts of the rapid electricity-sector
transformation. Providing long-term signals regarding emission limits, for example, may allow electric power companies to
focus investments on lower-emitting generation options. This,
in turn, allows for a more deliberate transition away from
higher-emitting resources, thus providing more certainty regarding energy jobs and allowing states to take measures to assist with retraining and economic development efforts.
Strategies to address the environmental impacts of the
electricity system may vary. In addition to environmental markets or compensation for desirable environmental attributes
(e.g., ZECs), policymakers can implement complementary measures such as renewable portfolio standards or traditional environmental regulations pursuant to federal and state environmental protection statutes. The important takeaway is that the
failure to ensure environmental protection may undermine the
economic and political stability of electricity markets. 266
D. Opportunities to Modernize Utilities via Market
Competition
The final lesson regarding electricity-sector competition focuses specifically on states with traditionally regulated utilities. Despite the potential for PUCs to more directly manage
fluctuations in fuel prices and new technology options, policymakers in these states are grappling with some of the same
challenges as policymakers in restructured states. Low natural
gas prices are also causing vertically integrated monopolies to
shutter coal-fired power plants, and they raise questions
regarding the future viability of existing nuclear power plants.
Incorporating an energy transition charge could help states
fund economic development efforts, provide job retraining,
bolster pensions, and provide social services for employees and
communities affected by plant closures. Similarly, forwardthinking environmental policies could provide greater certainty

265. See Gilbert E. Metcalf, Designing a Carbon Tax to Reduce U.S.
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 3 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 63, 68–74 (2009).
266. See Spence, supra note 121, at 986–89.
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so utilities and PUCs could manage capital investments and
plant closures in a manner that better avoids rapid plant closures and at least partially mitigates stranded asset concerns. 267
Policymakers in traditionally regulated states also have an
opportunity to foster new approaches to generate investments,
risk analysis, and consumer choice by increasing opportunities
for third parties to compete with monopoly utilities. In this
sense, the threat of market competition may provide a set of external threats that motivate the utility to innovate in terms of
technologies, grid management, and customer services. 268 This
subsection introduces two such strategies. The first describes
options for utilizing competitive procurement to achieve public
policy goals. The second explores options for inducing utilities
to pursue new business strategies by increasing the risk of
market competition.
1. Implementing Public Policy Goals via Competitive
Procurement
Competitive procurement is contributing to falling renewable energy costs around the globe and could play a broader
role in U.S. states that utilize the cost-of-service model for

267. See, e.g., David Hoppock et al., Benefits of Early State Action in
Environmental Regulation of Electric Utilities: North Carolina’s Clean
Smokestacks Act (Nicholas Instit. for Envtl. Pol’y Solutions, Duke University,
Working Paper No. 12-05, July 2012), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/
climate/policydesign/benefits-of-early-state-action-in-environmental-regulation-ofelectric-utilities [https://perma.cc/CBZ3-PXPV] (analyzing the impact of North
Carolina’s Clean Smokestacks Act on the cost of complying with Obama-era Clean
Air Act rules).
268. This discussion borrows from scholarship on induced innovation that
explores how private firms react, or innovate, in response to exogenous factors
(factors outside the direct control of the firm) that impact the firms’
competitiveness. Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Toward a New
Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J. ECON. PERSPS.
97, 99–100 (1995) (developing what has become known as the “Porter
hypothesis”). The definition of innovation offered by these scholars tends to be
value neutral, considering whether a change occurred, not whether the change
satisfied specific normative criteria to demonstrate that the development was
desirable. Richard G. Newell et al., The Induced Innovation Hypothesis and
Energy-Saving Technological Change, 114 Q.J. ECON. 941, 944 (defining
innovation “as the introduction of a product model with a bundle of characteristics
that was not previously available, or the production of a previously available
bundle of characteristics at a cost that is lower than was previously feasible”).

7. MONAST_ (DO NOT DELETE)

724

4/10/2019 11:39 AM

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

setting electricity rates. 269 In traditionally regulated states, expanded use of competitive procurement programs could correct
some of the deficiencies of the cost-of-service model. A consistent critique of the monopoly public utility model is the disincentive for investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency. Competitive procurement is already contributing to
falling renewable energy costs around the globe and could play
a broader role in traditionally regulated states. 270
North Carolina’s new renewable energy legislation (HB
589) provides a useful model. Stripping the competitive bidding
provisions in HB 589 down to their core elements, the law sets
a target (i.e., an additional 2.6 GW of solar capacity within
forty-five months), establishes a competitive process to achieve
its public policy goal, allows third parties to compete with the
utility to achieve the target, allows the utility or its nonregulated subsidiaries to earn revenue if their bids are accepted,
and ensures the utility does not exercise undue market
power. 271 Together, these provisions ensure that the public policy goal will be met and allow ratepayers to benefit if independent (i.e., non-utility) companies can meet the goal at a
lower cost than the utility. Traditionally regulated states could
use similar processes to allow competitive bidding for efficiency
projects, energy storage, and demand response.
States could also utilize the HB 589 model to achieve other
societal benefits without increasing risk for ratepayers. For example, charging stations for electric vehicles present a complicated chicken-and-egg problem for PUCs. Commissioners may
be reluctant to approve capital investments and approve rate
recovery, including the rate of return, if charging stations are
269. INT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, RENEWABLE POWER GENERATION
COSTS IN 2017: KEY FINDINGS AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2017), http://irena.
org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2018/Jan/IRENA_2017_Power_Costs_
2018_summary.pdf?la=en&hash=6A74B8D3F7931DEF00AB88BD3B339CAE180D
11C3 [https://perma.cc/3HTP-7WTY].
270. Id. at 5.
271. H.B. 589, 2017 Gen. Assemb., N.C. Sess. Laws 192 (N.C. 2017);
Monitoring Analytics Is the Independent Market Monitor for PJM Interconnection,
MONITORING ANALYTICS, http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/company/about.shtml
(last visited Nov. 29, 2018) [https://perma.cc/CP7Q-XX5T] (noting that the
company’s role as independent market monitor includes “monitor[ing] the
potential of market participants to exercise undue market power, the behavior of
market participants that is consistent with attempts to exercise market power
and the market performance that results from the interaction of market structure
with participant behavior”).
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underutilized. 272 Competitive bidding, combined with the ability for prices to fluctuate, could mitigate the concern. The law
could allow firms that successfully bid on a charging station
project to engage in retail sales and to procure electricity from
whichever generators they choose. Companies bidding would
bear the risk if the facilities are not used. Similar to HB 589,
state legislative reform could permit unregulated companies affiliated with the monopoly to compete. This approach would
create opportunities for companies to develop the infrastructure that will be necessary for electric vehicles to gain market
share without placing risk on ratepayers. The competitive bidding approach thus removes barriers and is agnostic regarding
who provides the service.
Strategically increasing competition would not address the
challenges regarding costs for the cancelled South Carolina nuclear units, but it could help avoid future stranded asset risks
by utilizing market forces to vet the viability of new generation
projects rather than relying primarily on utility projections of
future needs and costs. Expanding opportunities for competition could create circumstances to take advantage of emerging
technologies such as battery storage, as well as increased penetration of renewable energy, to induce monopoly utilities to
consider additional options for meeting, or reducing, electricity
demand.
2. Utilizing the Risk of Competition to Spur New
Utility Strategies
Policymakers in traditionally regulated states may also
utilize the prospect of competition to spur regulated monopolies
to develop new strategies to respond to changing market conditions. Both Nevada examples described above fit the mold. The
credible risk that additional large consumers could secure their
own low-cost renewable energy contracts or that a majority of
voters will choose to restructure the state’s electricity sector
could provide powerful motivation for utility executives to consider alternate investments and customer options.
Net metering—a state-based mechanism with its roots in
PURPA and state renewable energy goals—is another example
of state policy allowing consumers to exert greater influence
272.

Shelley Welton, Clean Electrification, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 571, 603 (2017).
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over the direction of the electricity sector. 273 These state programs require utilities to compensate residential and commercial customers for renewable energy generation that is sold
onto the electricity grid, and thus provide limited opportunities
for retail and commercial customers to sell electricity to local
utilities or grid operators. Net metering has been a subject of
debate and criticism in recent years. 274 Many of these state
programs, which generally compensate the residential and
commercial customers at the full retail electricity rate, have
been in place for decades. 275 The policies are receiving attention now because the cost of solar panels has fallen to a point
where more consumers are now taking advantage of net metering opportunities. 276
The growing number of consumers benefiting from net metering policies, and utilities’ recognition of the potential threat
that rooftop solar compensation programs can present to future
utility revenues, suggests that net metering is serving as an
external factor that induces utilities to adjust their business
practices. 277 In that sense, it is functioning as a type of innovation policy that allows energy consumers to influence decisions
at the utility. Viewed in this light, the debate over cost turns on
more than just the fairness of compensating residential and
commercial providers of renewable electricity at a rate that
incorporates both the cost of generating and transporting
273. See Mark James et al., Planning for the Sun to Come Up: How Nevada
and California Explain the Future of Net Metering, 8 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE &
ENERGY 1, 2–8 (2017).
274. For a description of net metering, see Steven Ferrey, Net Legal Power, 53
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 221, 227–30 (2016); see also Richard L. Revesz & Burcin Unel,
Managing the Future of the Electricity Grid: Distributed Generation and Net
Metering, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 43, 71–77 (2017) (analyzing shortcomings of
net metering).
275. See State Net Metering Policies, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Nov.
20, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/net-metering-policy-overview-andstate-legislative-updates [https://perma.cc/6YXK-L8XP].
276. See, e.g., Troy A. Rule, Solar Energy, Utilities, and Fairness, 6 SAN DIEGO
J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 115, 118–19 (2015) (“As rooftop solar development
becomes more commonplace, it is likely to dampen demand for grid-supplied
power and thereby cut into utilities’ profits.”); Michael Wara, Competition at the
Grid Edge: Innovation and Antitrust Law in the Electricity Sector, 25 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 176, 189 (2017) (“To date, the most common response by utilities to
the disruptive challenge presented by distributed solar has been to propose
changes to retail rate structures that act to reduce solar power’s cost advantage
over grid-supplied energy.”).
277. See Rule, supra note 276, at 118–25 (summarizing utility efforts to lobby
for changes to state net metering policies).
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energy, as opposed to simply compensating at the rate offered
for generation.
While more customers are taking advantage of net metering, these customers represent a small fraction of most utilities’
total number of ratepayers. 278 The actual cost that net
metering is currently imposing on most electricity consumers is
therefore low. 279 If concerns about the prospect of increased
participation by retail and commercial consumers cause utilities to develop cost-effective strategies to respond to consumer
demand for renewable energy, net metering could provide an
efficient policy mechanism to motivate utilities to pursue, and
PUCs to approve, new programs that provide societal benefits
while maintaining affordable and reliable power.
Society may be willing to pay more for innovative technologies, or use of those technologies, if they offer societal benefits.
In this instance, assessments of the merits of net metering
should consider the ability for consumers to exert greater influence over the direction of the electricity sector and ensure that
values beyond affordability are taken into consideration. 280 At
the moment, few customers are taking advantage of net metering policies. 281
Other state programs may also create external forces that
push incumbent utilities to change behavior. Like net metering
programs, third-party leasing for residential and commercial
installations of solar energy removes financial barriers to
renewable energy. These programs also allow independent (i.e.,
non-utility) companies a limited ability to sell electricity to
retail consumers. 282 Allowing third parties to access smart

278. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SHORT-TERM ENERGY OUTLOOK SUPPLEMENT:
EXPANDED FORECASTS FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY CAPACITY AND GENERATION
(July 2017), https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/special/supplements/2017/2017_sp
_02.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y78S-UDXF].
279. See Mark Muro & Devashree Saha, Rooftop Solar: Net Metering Is a Net
Benefit, BROOKINGS (May 23, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/rooftopsolar-net-metering-is-a-net-benefit/ [https://perma.cc/JC65-5EKK].
280. Welton, supra note 262, at 1096 (noting that electricity sector “choices and
values . . . extend far beyond what technologies are available at what costs”).
281. Uma Outka, Fairness in the Low-Carbon Shift: Learning from
Environmental Justice, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 789, 806–07 (2017).
282. See, e.g., Solar Power Free-Market Financing Act of 2015, GA. CODE ANN.
§ 46-3-65 (2018).
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meter data could also allow companies to develop new services,
inducing utilities to do the same. 283
CONCLUSION
Competition necessarily creates winners and losers. Early
responses to the disruptions created by sustained low natural
gas prices rely on subsidizing facilities that find themselves
unable to compete. 284 Policymakers may determine that subsidies are necessary in the short term, but longer-term solutions
are necessary to mitigate local economic impacts of shutting
down plants and moving to new forms of generation and
conservation.
Recent history and different state regulatory models allow
a nuanced, critical view of the role of market competition and
the implications of facilitating and restricting competition. This
article identifies four overarching lessons that should inform
federal and state officials as they reconsider the merits of electricity-sector competition and the market design elements necessary to ensure that competition achieves, or does not undermine, societal goals. Most importantly, value choices remain
central to electricity-sector governance.
In the absence of proactive measures to achieve social
goals while the sector evolves, reactive measures will likely
continue. These measures could impact the sector as a whole
and frustrate, rather than facilitate, achieving long-term social
goals. For example, decarbonization will be expensive and
changing market rules may result in inefficient investments
and underutilized assets. Companies that have made recent
investments in new, efficient natural gas combined-cycle turbines—the type of investment that is causing economic pressure for nuclear plants in competitive states—may have less
market share than they would in the absence of nuclear subsidies. Furthermore, the rapidly falling prices for energy storage
could allow renewable energy to play a significant role in replacing generation in the event large nuclear or coal plants
283. For example, the Arkansas PSC is considering granting third parties
access to data from advanced metering infrastructure. In the Matter of an
Investigation of Policies Related to Distributed Energy Resources, Docket No. 16028-U, Order No. 5, Nov. 9, 2017, http://www.apscservices.info/pdf/16/16-028U_97_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5KU-T2CG].
284. See Dlouhy, supra note 87.

7. MONAST_ (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

ELECTRICITY COMPETITION

4/10/2019 11:39 AM

729

retire. Without the opening created by retiring plants, there
may be fewer opportunities for storage projects than there
otherwise would be.
Electricity market vacillations will continue as coal plants
continue to retire, battery storage becomes viable, the transportation sector begins to electrify, and society continues to demand that the electricity sector decarbonize. State and federal
policymakers can take proactive steps to realize the benefits of
competition and manage the potential downsides in restructured and traditionally regulated markets.

